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ABSTRACT 
Silicon Valley’s success has led other regions to attempt their own 
high-tech transformations, yet most imitators have failed. Entrepreneurs 
may be in short supply in these “non-tech” regions, but some non-tech 
regions are home to high-quality entrepreneurs who relocate to Silicon 
Valley due to a lack of local financing for their start-ups. Non-tech regions 
must provide local finance to prevent entrepreneurial relocation and reap 
spillover benefits for their communities. This Article compares three 
possible sources of entrepreneurial finance—private venture capital, 
state-sponsored venture capital, and angel investor groups—and finds that 
angel groups have distinct advantages when it comes to funding 
innovation in non-tech regions. This entrepreneurial finance story is then 
supplemented by a “law and entrepreneurship” story—specifically, a look 
at securities laws that might impede optimal levels of angel group 
financing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How might a ―non-tech‖ region transform itself into a high-tech 
entrepreneurial community? The success of California‘s Silicon Valley 
makes high-tech transformations the holy grail of economic development 
for regions that continue to lose jobs in manufacturing, agriculture, and 
other traditional sectors. Many of these non-tech regions have pursued 
high-tech transformations because of the high-paying new jobs, increased 
tax revenues, and educated workforce they bring. In light of Silicon 
Valley‘s success, there have been any number of ―Silicon Prairies,‖ 
―Silicon Forests,‖ ―Silicon Alleys,‖ and ―Silicon Beaches‖ attempted 
throughout the United States and abroad.
1
 
 
 
 1. This Article confines its analysis to the United States. For discussions of international high-
tech communities, see generally BUILDING HIGH-TECH CLUSTERS: SILICON VALLEY AND BEYOND 
(Timothy Bresnahan & Alfonso Gambardella eds., 2007) [hereinafter BUILDING HIGH-TECH 
CLUSTERS]; DAVID ROSENBERG, CLONING SILICON VALLEY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF HIGH-TECH 
HOTSPOTS (2002) (discussing Cambridge, Helsinki, Tel Aviv, Bangalore, Singapore, and Hsinchu-
Taipei). 
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Yet despite a few successes, most imitators have failed.
2
 High-tech 
firms are important drivers of U.S. economic growth in today‘s knowledge 
economy, but gains from innovation-based economic growth are highly 
skewed toward a few regions. As economic developers in non-tech regions 
have learned, ―there is no secret sauce‖ that will lead to a broader 
distribution of these gains.
3
 Causal relationships are exceedingly difficult 
to draw in this area. We may find correlations, but causation remains 
elusive. Therefore, the best we may be able to do is learn from Silicon 
Valley‘s success to better understand the forces that drive 
entrepreneurship. Further, examining isolated successes like Silicon 
Valley may not be the best methodology since many failures share traits 
with their successful counterparts.
4
 Still, with the limits of such an 
undertaking in mind, scholars from multiple disciplines have examined 
Silicon Valley in an attempt to understand its key elements. Their work 
has revealed the importance of the region‘s venture capital market, history, 
universities, industry, and culture.
5
  
Most would-be imitators will not be so fortunate as to possess all, or 
even most, of the necessary elements. Probably the best that non-tech 
regions can do, even if successful, is create Silicon Valley ―lites,‖ or 
regions that possess the core elements of a start-up driven community, yet 
are less dynamic than Silicon Valley as a fully formed entrepreneurial 
 
 
 2. Even Silicon Valley visionary Frederick Terman, discussed infra note 30 and accompanying 
text, could not help other regions recreate his model. See generally Stuart W. Leslie, The Biggest 
“Angel” of Them All: The Military and the Making of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON 
VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 48, 67 (Martin Kenney ed., 2000) 
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY] (arguing that Terman ―overemphasized the 
university‘s value in the Silicon Valley equation, a common pitfall, as subsequent efforts at high-
technology regional development would show‖); see also Timothy J. Sturgeon, How Silicon Valley 
Came to Be, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra, at 15, 47 (―As economic development tools 
these schemes [to recreate Silicon Valley through university-industry collaborations] have met with 
very limited success. However, they continue to absorb the resources of planning agencies and 
universities in countless locations.‖) (citations omitted); Stuart W. Leslie & Robert H. Kargon, Selling 
Silicon Valley: Frederick Terman’s Model for Regional Advantage, 70 BUS. HIST. REV. 435 (1996) 
(discussing the failures of New Jersey and Dallas but the surprising success of Korea). 
 3. Posting of Gordon Smith to The Conglomerate, There is No Secret Sauce, http://www.the 
conglomerate.org/2008/06/there-is-no-sec.html (June 9, 2008). 
 4. See, e.g., LEONARD MLODINOW, THE DRUNKARD‘S WALK: HOW RANDOMNESS RULES OUR 
LIVES 178–81 (2008) (discussing the ―hot-hand fallacy,‖ a common misperception that repeated 
success resulted from specific actions rather than chance, and saying that ―among a large group . . . it 
would be very odd if one of them didn’t experience a long streak of successes or failures‖) (emphasis 
in original). PAUL ORMEROD, WHY MOST THINGS FAIL: EVOLUTION, EXTINCTION AND ECONOMICS 12 
(2005) (―The tendency to overemphasize successes, and to rationalize them ex post is chronically 
endemic amongst business historians . . . It is failure rather than success which is the distinguishing 
feature of corporate life.‖) (internal quotations omitted).  
 5. See infra Part I. 
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ecosystem. As Martin Kenney astutely observes, the ―ultimate result [of 
cloning efforts] could be regions that, although possibly not as dynamic as 
Silicon Valley, might become self-reinforcing hotbeds of innovation, with 
their own set of institutions dedicated to new firm formation.‖6 
How might a non-tech region go about becoming a Silicon Valley lite? 
This Article will address one critical piece of that puzzle—the financing of 
local entrepreneurs. Financing is a critical piece for the following reason: 
while some non-tech regions will suffer from a lack of entrepreneurial 
talent, anecdotal data reveals that other regions are home to high-quality 
entrepreneurs who end up relocating their start-ups to Silicon Valley to be 
close to financing sources.
7
 This may seem ironic, as globalization has 
generally diminished the importance of physical locality. But for reasons 
that will be discussed, entrepreneurial finance is different, where physical 
proximity continues to take on much importance.
8
 It follows that non-tech 
regions must provide local finance to prevent entrepreneurial relocation 
and reap spillover benefits for their communities. Otherwise, 
entrepreneurial relocation prevents a chain of events that might lead to 
new start-ups and new sources of financial capital in the non-tech region.
9
 
Given the importance of finance in the innovation equation, this Article 
offers the first comparative analysis of three possible sources of 
entrepreneurial finance for non-tech regions: private venture capital, state-
sponsored venture capital, and angel investor groups.
10
 
Private venture capital dominates the entrepreneurial finance literature, 
and with good reason: it has a demonstrated record of success in 
innovation funding. But when it comes to broader distribution of 
innovation-based gains, private venture capital fails to deliver due to its 
concentration in existing tech regions and preference for later-stage start-
ups. Private venture capital is noticeably absent for those early-stage start-
ups seeking funding in non-tech regions. State-sponsored venture capital 
programs correct these deficiencies but create new ones, namely a lack of 
market incentives and relevant expertise in technology funding. There is, 
 
 
 6. Martin Kenney, Introduction, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra note 2, at 1, 12. 
 7. See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 10. This is not to suggest that these are the only three sources of entrepreneurial finance. Others 
include Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) and the federal Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program. In addition, banks and private firms provide significant loans to start-ups as 
―venture debt‖—in 2006, nearly $2 billion. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. 
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); Pui-Wing Tam, Venture Funding Twist: Start-Ups Increasingly Take 
on Debt to Keep Businesses Chugging Along, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2007, at C1. 
  
 
 
 
 
2010] FINANCING THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY 721 
 
 
 
 
however, another source of innovation funding that does not suffer from 
the drawbacks of venture capital. That source of funding is the angel 
investor group.  
Angel investors are wealthy individuals who, unlike venture capitalists 
(VCs), invest their personal funds in high-tech start-ups.
11
 As might be 
expected because they invest their own money, angels invest smaller 
amounts than private VCs. However, angels invest in more start-ups and, 
in the aggregate, supply $25 billion of annual funding to start-ups—the 
same size as the aggregate venture capital market.
12
 There is a wide range 
of individuals who fall into the category of ―angel,‖13 but the most 
important angels for purposes of this Article are those professional 
investors who are now organizing into regional angel investor groups. 
Angel groups have many theoretical advantages for funding entrepreneurs 
in non-tech regions, including: wide geographic distribution and a 
preference for local investments; a preference for early-stage start-ups; 
market incentives to fund start-ups that will offer the best rate of return; 
and relevant expertise in technology businesses. All of these advantages 
will be explored, along with attendant disadvantages.  
Finally, some angel group investors have revealed a concern that 
certain securities laws might cast a cloud of uncertainty over the typical 
angel group funding process. My ―law and entrepreneurship‖ analysis, 
which focuses on private placement and broker-dealer laws, finds some 
cause for concern. Of course, the securities laws are only one of many 
factors that may cause inefficiencies in the angel funding process. Other 
legal and non-legal infrastructure could have the same effect. Further, 
there may also be affirmative steps that governments could take, over and 
above removing legal and non-legal financing impediments, to entice 
higher levels of angel investing. State or federal tax credits for angel 
investing are an example. However, my preference for letting 
entrepreneurial communities develop organically, rather than trying to 
force them,
14
 causes me to leave discussion of affirmative government 
involvement to others. 
At this point, two important caveats about this project must be set forth. 
First, my perspective is one of regional economic growth and the 
 
 
 11. See infra Part IV.A for an attempt to define ―angel investors.‖ 
 12. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 13. The category is broad enough to include rich Uncle Joe, an example of the quasi-friend and 
family member, and extremely wealthy ex-entrepreneurs such as Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen. The 
advantages and disadvantages of different types of angels are discussed infra notes 111–13 and 
accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 16–21 and accompanying text. 
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distribution of high-tech gains, rather than aggregate social welfare. In 
other words, I am not arguing that U.S. start-ups are underfunded, but 
instead that most of our start-up financiers are concentrated in existing-
tech regions, which causes entrepreneurs to relocate to those regions. 
Entrepreneurial relocation may or may not decrease social welfare in the 
aggregate—this is an open question15—but it does keep the distribution of 
innovation-based gains skewed toward existing-tech regions. My focus, 
for better or worse, is not on aggregate social welfare per se but on broader 
distribution of innovation-based gains from existing-tech regions to non-
tech regions.  
Second, my arguments in favor of angel groups from this distributional 
perspective should be seen as an attempt at ground-theory building, rather 
than a truism supported by empirical data. Angel groups are only about a 
decade old, but once they mature past their infancy, empirical studies 
should be undertaken to test these arguments. For now, it is important to 
construct a theory of comparative entrepreneurial finance that can then be 
tested. 
With this framework and these caveats in mind, this Article proceeds as 
follows. Part I dissects the literature on Silicon Valley to discover the 
many elements at work there. Part II narrows the focus of this Article from 
all elements of Silicon Valley, as a fully formed ecosystem, to the base 
elements necessary to turn a non-tech region into a Silicon Valley lite; 
namely, human capital and financial capital. It argues that while human 
capital in the form of high-quality entrepreneurs with new ideas 
sometimes exists in non-tech regions, a lack of financial capital means that 
these entrepreneurs will relocate to be near funding sources. Part III 
narrows the focus of the Article even further and fixes its gaze on the 
funding problem, and in particular on the deficiencies of venture capital 
(both private and state-sponsored) as a solution. After finding venture 
capital wanting, Part IV moves into fresh territory by introducing angel 
investor groups as a promising alternative for innovation funding in non-
tech regions. Finally, Part V adds a ―law and entrepreneurship‖ story to 
 
 
 15. This is a complex question that I do not seek to answer here. Scholars have observed that 
clustering into existing high-tech regions increases aggregate social welfare through economies of 
scale, ready supply of suppliers and customers, and deep labor pools. See, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 222–30 (8th ed. 1920). But there might reach a point, once existing 
clusters become too large, where aggregate social welfare would be increased through broader 
geographical distribution of high-tech activity. For instance, if the traffic becomes too bad and the cost 
of living becomes too high in Silicon Valley (if this is not the case already), labor may migrate to other 
areas that are more affordable and offer a better quality of life. 
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the entrepreneurial finance story when it examines some possible legal 
impediments to optimal levels of angel group financing. 
I. THE SILICON VALLEY ECOSYSTEM 
As the United States transitions from the ―old‖ manufacturing economy 
to the ―new‖ knowledge economy, non-tech regions (i.e., those heavy in 
old economy sectors) have attempted high-tech transformations for the 
high-paying new jobs, increased tax revenues, local wealth, and educated 
workforce those transformations bring. On a macro level, there are two 
competing models for undertaking a high-tech transformation. On the one 
hand, both Silicon Valley and Boston‘s Route 128 sprang up organically 
rather than through centralized government planning. In addition, both are 
driven by smaller, highly innovative start-ups as opposed to established 
firms. On the other hand, we see a very different model in North 
Carolina‘s Research Triangle Park (RTP). Rather than coming about 
organically, RTP was entirely planned by state and local officials.
16
 Also, 
rather than relying on start-ups, the state focused on attracting the research 
divisions of major corporations.
17
 Thus, in RTP we see a centrally planned 
rather than an organic process driven by established firms rather than start-
ups. Another imitator, Austin, Texas, appears to be somewhat of a hybrid 
between the two models. It began its transformation under the vision of 
George Kozmetsky
18
 by luring major corporations to the area,
19
 but it also 
houses its fair share of start-ups, including now-giant Dell Computer, as 
well as a prominent venture capital firm, Austin Ventures.  
Despite the relative success of RTP and Austin, this Article puts 
centrally planned communities and hybrids to one side and considers 
cloning efforts that do not, in fact, require any government effort at all. 
Instead, my focus is on cloning efforts that come about organically 
 
 
 16. See generally ALBERT N. LINK, A GENEROSITY OF SPIRIT: THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE 
RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK (1995). 
 17. See id. at 87–93 (discussing some of the early companies, including IBM, and federal 
research centers relocating to RTP). 
 18. George Kozmetsky was co-founder of the technology giant Teledyne and ―the father of 
Austin high technology.‖ Jim Rapp, The Austin Miracle: Silicon Hills, http://www.asra.gov.ab.ca/ 
resources/publicdocs/ict/ICTcore08a.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2009).  
 19. See Jonathan Miller, Regional Case Study: Austin, Texas or “How to Create a Knowledge 
Economy,” Washington, DC: Delegation of the European Commission to the United States, European 
Union, 1999 (the ―watershed event in Austin‘s high tech development occurred in 1983 when the city 
won the nationwide competition for Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation 
(MCC)‖). After MCC, Austin was able to recruit major divisions of 3M, SEMATECH, IBM, and 
Motorola. Joel Wiggins & David V. Gibson, Overview of US Incubators and the Case of the Austin 
Technology Incubator, 3 INT‘L J. ENTRE. & INNOVATION MGMT. 56, 59 (2003). 
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through the actions of private actors incentivized by high-tech profit 
potential. The organic model is, in my view, superior for at least two 
reasons. First, our manifestations of this model—Silicon Valley and to a 
lesser extent Route 128—remain our most notable success stories in high-
tech community building. Second, when looking at prior attempts to 
replicate Silicon Valley, other commentators have expressed skepticism 
toward centrally planned processes
20
 and praise for spontaneity.
21
 A 
separate analysis would be required for centrally planned communities. 
By any standard, Silicon Valley is our most prominent example of an 
organic, start-up driven, high-tech transformation. A confluence of factors 
turned what was, as recently as 1950, the ―Prune Capital of America‖ into 
one of the most advanced and prosperous regions anywhere in the world. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find a number of efforts at understanding 
Silicon Valley‘s particular brand of success. It bears repeating that even if 
we understand Silicon Valley, that does not mean we can replicate it. 
Gordon Moore, one of the founders of Silicon Valley-based Intel, 
colorfully warns against a formulaic approach to cloning efforts. 
According to Moore and Kevin Davis, the typical formula looks 
something like: ―Combine liberal amounts of Technology, Entrepreneurs, 
Capital, and Sunshine. Add one (1) University. Stir Vigorously.‖22 Still, it 
is worth examining the factors that explain Silicon Valley‘s success to 
help new regions better understand the forces that drive entrepreneurship. 
While the existing literature on Silicon Valley fills several books, some 
central themes emerge.  
As a foundational matter, venture capital markets matter. Venture 
capital markets are defined broadly by Professor Ron Gilson to mean both 
 
 
 20. See Timothy Bresnahan & Alfonso Gambardella, Old-Economy Inputs for New-Economy 
Outcomes: What Have We Learned?, in BUILDING HIGH-TECH CLUSTERS, supra note 1, at 331, 355 
(―Clusters of innovative activity do not respond well to being directed, organized, or jump-started, 
entrepreneurship being a quirky thing.‖); Martin Kenney & Urs von Burg, Institutions and Economies: 
Creating Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra note 2, at 218, 239 (Attempts to 
clone Silicon Valley ―have been conceived by government officials and local land developers with 
little understanding of the historical conditions that evolved into Silicon Valley. . . . We are somewhat 
pessimistic about policies aimed at cloning Silicon Valley.‖); Leslie, supra note 2, at 48 (―Some 
localities, following the lead of the Research Triangle, designate technology parks on the theory that if 
you build it, they—branch plants of multinational corporations—will come . . . .‖). 
 21. See Gert-Jan Hospers et al., The Next Silicon Valley? On the Relationship Between 
Geographical Clustering and Public Policy, 5 INT‘L ENTRE. & MGMT. J. 285, 291 (2009) (―As 
illustrated by the genesis of the micro-electronics cluster in Silicon Valley, the birth, life and death of 
clusters is essentially part of a spontaneous order that rests on entrepreneurial discovery and the 
generation of explicit and tacit knowledge.‖). 
 22. Gordon Moore & Kevin Davis, Learning the Silicon Valley Way, in BUILDING HIGH-TECH 
CLUSTERS, supra note 1, at 7, 9.  
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entrepreneurs and proper funding for their ventures.
23
 Under Gilson‘s 
framework, proper funding consists of both risk capital—the money—and 
knowledgeable financial intermediaries—the expertise to invest it 
wisely.
24
 Silicon Valley‘s venture capital market is the most sophisticated 
in the world. In Silicon Valley, venture capital firms act as the financial 
intermediaries with pension funds, endowments, and individual investors 
supplying the risk capital. Silicon Valley is home to the world‘s leading 
venture capital firms, including Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers and 
Sequoia Capital.
25
 Silicon Valley‘s entrepreneurs are legendary. As will be 
discussed in the next Part, without the combination of this financial and 
human capital, other regions cannot hope to replicate Silicon Valley‘s 
success. These elements are necessary for cloning efforts, but probably not 
sufficient. Therefore, we must understand the other elements layered on 
top of these base elements to explain Silicon Valley‘s unique brand of 
success. 
Another important element in the development of not only Silicon 
Valley, but also Route 128, is a unique history—in both cases, the 
important role of military funding for technological innovation. Both 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 received significant funding from the U.S. 
military that jumpstarted their high-tech transformations. The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was the larger beneficiary of 
military funding during World War II due to the political connections of 
former MIT electrical engineering professor Vannevar Bush.
26
 Silicon 
Valley, on the other hand, made more substantial gains due to military 
funding during the early Cold War.
27
 Without military funding, it is 
doubtful that either Silicon Valley or Route 128 would exist in their 
present form. It is important to note, however, that the military funding 
 
 
 23. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See TOM PERKINS, VALLEY BOY: THE EDUCATION OF TOM PERKINS 101–25 (2007) 
(detailing the origins of Kleiner Perkins). 
 26. See SUSAN ROSEGRANT & DAVID LAMPE, ROUTE 128: LESSONS FROM BOSTON‘S HIGH-
TECH COMMUNITY 80 (1992) (―Probably no other state benefited as much from Bush‘s redirection of 
government research spending—and the commercial spillover that resulted—as Massachusetts. And 
without a doubt, no university reaped more rewards than MIT, which became the nation‘s unofficial 
center for wartime research.‖). 
 27. See Leslie, supra note 2, at 67 (attributing the successful collaboration between Stanford and 
local industry to ―a mutual dependence on the special circumstances of the early Cold War‖). But see 
Moore & Davis, supra note 22, at 24 (arguing that such accounts overemphasize the government‘s 
historical role in the development of Silicon Valley because the government emphasized proven ability 
over innovativeness meaning that ―the products the military purchased were rarely at the leading edge 
of product development‖). 
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was provided for the government‘s own wartime purposes, and not as an 
effort to jumpstart a high-tech transformation in either Boston or Silicon 
Valley. Therefore, scholars still consider these regions to be organic high-
tech communities rather than centrally planned.
28
 
Third, academic institutions and the clustering of high-tech industries 
matter. On the academic side, Silicon Valley boasts world-class research 
universities in Stanford and the University of California–Berkeley. On the 
industry side, Silicon Valley became home to the burgeoning electronics 
industry, the epicenter of the Internet revolution, and now a leader in the 
emerging ―clean-tech‖ movement. Firms in these areas, as well as labor 
and suppliers, cluster together in the region.
29
 It is not only the presence of 
top universities and industry leaders, however, but also the interaction 
between them that contributes to development. Hewlett-Packard co-
founders Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard were Stanford University 
students and protégés of Frederick Terman, the Stanford engineering 
professor, dean, and later provost who served as the ―spark that 
transformed orange and walnut groves into the center of high 
technology.‖30 Terman actively encouraged collaborations between 
Stanford and the booming electronics industry, and the resulting 
knowledge spillover ran in both directions. Stanford was a large producer 
of the first wave of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, who then returned to 
campus to share their wisdom with emerging entrepreneurs. The Stanford 
Research Park, where many of the start-ups were housed, is viewed as 
integral to these collaborative efforts.
31
 Accounts of Route 128 and even 
RTP also emphasize the importance of top universities, innovative 
industries, and university-industry collaborations.
32
  
 
 
 28. See Kenney & von Burg, supra note 20, at 239. 
 29. On clustering, see, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Location, Competition, and Economic 
Development: Local Clusters in a Global Economy, 14 ECON. DEV. Q. 15 (2000). 
 30. John C. Dean, Fueling The Revolution: Commercial Bank Financing, in THE SILICON 
VALLEY EDGE: A HABITAT FOR INNOVATION AND ENTRE. 314, 315 (Chong-Moon Lee et al. eds., 
2000) [hereinafter THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE]; see also Leslie & Kargon, supra note 2, at 435 (―If 
anyone deserved to be called ‗the father of Silicon Valley,‘ it was Frederick Terman. As Stanford 
University professor, dean of engineering and provost, it was Terman who first envisioned Silicon 
Valley‘s unique partnership of academia and industry and trained the first generation of students who 
made it happen.‖).  
 31. See Leslie & Kargon, supra note 2, at 440 (describing Stanford Research Park as ―the earliest 
and perhaps most successful effort to foster academic-industrial cooperation by developing a high 
technology park on university land.‖). Stanford Research Park housed, among many other tenants, the 
legendary Fairchild Semiconductor—the firm in which the integrated circuit was developed. See infra 
notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 32. See ROSEGRANT & LAMPE, supra note 26, at 13 (attributing Route 128‘s success to the 
interplay between MIT, local industry, and the federal government); LINK, supra note 16, at 4 (theory 
of RTP was that the region‘s ―three academic institutions could act as a magnet to attract research 
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Fourth, Silicon Valley is home to unique support institutions, including 
law firms, investment banks, marketing consultants, executive search 
firms, and intellectual property liquidators with expertise in the high-tech 
arena.
33
 While most of these support institutions also operate in other 
regions, their operation in Silicon Valley is unique. For example, Silicon 
Valley investment banks specialize in underwriting high-tech IPOs, and 
Silicon Valley executive search firms boast expertise in high-tech 
placements.
34
 Mark Suchman‘s pioneering work on Silicon Valley law 
firms reveals a prime example of Silicon Valley‘s unique support 
system.
35
 While business lawyers are traditionally thought of as purely 
economic actors, or in Ron Gilson‘s terms ―transaction cost engineers,‖36 
Suchman revealed that Silicon Valley lawyers play more of a sociological 
networking function between VCs and entrepreneurs than serving 
traditional economic goals of protecting intellectual property and litigating 
disputes.
37
 
Fifth, Silicon Valley has a unique culture. As AnnaLee Saxenian has 
observed, Silicon Valley is home to unique sociological networks and an 
open and sharing entrepreneurial culture, even among high-tech 
competitors.
38
 Saxenian also explains how Silicon Valley‘s high degree of 
labor mobility allows it to experience repeated bursts of innovation over 
time. It is here that Saxenian differentiates Silicon Valley from Boston‘s 
Route 128. Route 128 possessed many of the same initial elements as 
Silicon Valley—first-rate entrepreneurs like Digital Equipment 
Corporation‘s Ken Olson, the first venture capital firm,39 and the early 
advantage in wartime funding. Yet Route 128 failed to build upon its 
initial success, which allowed Silicon Valley to surpass it as the world‘s 
 
 
companies to North Carolina. The location of research companies would lead to the development of 
new industry, and new industry would in turn spur the state‘s waning economic base‖). 
 33. Kenney, supra note 6, at 5; Ronald J. Mann, An Empirical Investigation of Liquidation 
Choices of Failed High Tech Firms, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1375, 1390–91 (2004) (discussing the benefits 
of California‘s specialized high-tech liquidators over bankruptcy trustees in disposing of intellectual 
property assets). 
 34. Thomas F. Hellmann, Venture Capitalists: The Coaches of Silicon Valley, in THE SILICON 
VALLEY EDGE, supra note 30, at 276, 291.  
 35. See, e.g., Mark C. Suchman, Dealmakers and Counselors: Law Firms as Intermediaries in 
the Development of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra note 2, at 71. 
 36. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 
YALE L.J. 239, 253–56 (1984). 
 37. Suchman, supra note 35, at 78. 
 38. See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION 
IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994). 
 39. That firm was Georges Doriot‘s American Research and Development. See SPENCER E. 
ANTE, CREATIVE CAPITAL: GEORGES DORIOT AND THE BIRTH OF VENTURE CAPITAL 129–46 (2008). 
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premier high-tech region. Saxenian attributes Silicon Valley‘s regional 
advantage to its capacity to reset, repeat, and regenerate, which Route 128 
did not possess—self-regeneration that was made possible through high 
levels of labor mobility and the resulting knowledge spillover it 
produces.
40
 Saxenian credits progressive West Coast cultural norms for the 
fluid movement of high-tech talent in Silicon Valley, while stodgy East 
Coast norms kept would-be entrepreneurs within the same, established 
firms.
41
 
Finally, Silicon Valley‘s legal infrastructure helps to explain its 
success, but that discussion will be deferred to Part V. The takeaway from 
this Part is that a number of factors went into making Silicon Valley what 
it is today. Whether those factors are causes of that success or effects, 
however, is not always clear.  
II. THE BASE ELEMENTS OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMUNITY 
As we have seen, Silicon Valley itself is a highly evolved ecosystem, 
thanks to a confluence of multiple factors, not to mention first-mover 
advantages that would be incredibly difficult to replicate elsewhere. 
Thankfully, my question is more modest: what elements are necessary, at a 
bare minimum, to turn a non-tech region into a Silicon Valley ―lite‖—a 
less dynamic, but nonetheless sustainable, entrepreneurial community? (A 
separate paper could be written on what might turn a Silicon Valley lite 
into a rival to Silicon Valley.) On the most basic level, to undertake a 
high-tech transformation, non-tech regions must possess both human 
capital in the form of entrepreneurs with new ideas and financial capital in 
the form of funding for entrepreneurial start-ups.
42
 Without either, the 
transformation will not occur. In other words, human capital and financial 
capital may be thought of as necessary, if not sufficient, elements needed 
to bring about a Silicon Valley lite. In short, out of the five elements 
discussed in the previous Part, a venture capital market—broadly defined 
to include both entrepreneurs and their financiers—is the most important, 
 
 
 40. SAXENIAN, supra note 38, at 34. 
 41. Id. at 2. 
 42. The focus on combining human capital with financial capital is another way of expressing 
Professor Gilson‘s idea of a venture capital market. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. See 
also Paul Graham, How to Be Silicon Valley (May 2006), http://www.paulgraham.com/silicon 
valley.html (arguing colorfully that ―you only need two kinds of people to create a [start-up] hub: rich 
people and nerds‖). 
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or at least the most foundational. While this Article focuses on financial 
capital, it will digress briefly to ask how a region attracts human capital.
43
 
Existing high-tech regions replenish their entrepreneurial talent from 
multiple sources. Universities such as Stanford and MIT supply engineers 
like Dave Packard, Jerry Yang, Sergey Brin, and Larry Page. 
Entrepreneurs also leave existing start-ups to start new ones. For instance, 
the legendary Silicon Valley company Fairchild Semiconductor spun off 
from Shockley Semiconductor in 1957.
44
 The ―Traitorous Eight‖ defectors 
from Shockley went on to develop the integrated circuit while at Fairchild 
and later spun off into several more start-ups, most notably Intel.
45
 
Research labs at established firms also produce new entrepreneurs who 
leave to form start-ups. Consider, for example, the many software 
entrepreneurs in Microsoft-dominated Seattle or Internet entrepreneurs 
located near AOL‘s headquarters in Northern Virginia.46 
The presence of top universities, existing start-ups, and established 
firms attracts many of the best entrepreneurs to existing-tech regions. This 
creates a problem for non-tech regions on the human capital side. Other 
factors can make it even more difficult for non-tech regions to compete for 
human capital. Richard Florida has argued that factors such as an 
intolerance for diversity can make a region unattractive to the ―creative 
class‖ that is likely to include high-tech entrepreneurs.47 Indeed, this 
observation would offer a partial explanation for why two places with 
excellent university programs in high-tech areas—Pittsburgh‘s Carnegie 
 
 
 43. See Edward L. Glaeser & William R. Kerr, Local Industrial Conditions and 
Entrepreneurship: How Much of the Spatial Distribution Can We Explain? 26 (Harvard Bus. Sch. 
Entrepreneurial Mgmt. Working Paper No. 09-055 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1280283 (empirical study suggesting that ―people and their human capital are 
probably the crucial ingredient for most new entrepreneurs‖ but which studied only the manufacturing 
sector). 
 44. See generally Christopher Lécuyer, Fairchild Semiconductor and Its Influence, in THE 
SILICON VALLEY EDGE, supra note 30, at 158, 158–83. 
 45. See generally LESLIE BERLIN, THE MAN BEHIND THE MICROCHIP: ROBERT NOYCE AND THE 
INVENTION OF SILICON VALLEY (2005). Another Fairchild founder, Eugene Kleiner, went on to found 
the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins. 
 46. See E. Floyd Kvamme, Life in Silicon Valley: A First-Hand View of the Region’s Growth, in 
THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE, supra note 30, at 59, 79 (using the examples of Microsoft and AOL to 
show ―how much fruit can come from a single seed‖); Susan Preston, Seraph Capital Forum: National 
Trends in a Local Context, in STATE OF THE ART: AN EXECUTIVE BRIEFING ON CUTTING-EDGE 
PRACTICES IN AMERICAN ANGEL INVESTING 62, 63 (John May & Elizabeth F. O‘Halloran eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter STATE OF THE ART] (discussing the pervasive influence of Microsoft in creating Seattle‘s 
entrepreneurial culture, including ―the number of new ventures started by ex-Microsoft employees‖). 
 47. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND HOW IT‘S TRANSFORMING 
WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002) [hereinafter CREATIVE CLASS]; see also 
RICHARD FLORIDA, CITIES AND THE CREATIVE CLASS (2005) [hereinafter CITIES]. 
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Mellon (computer science) and St. Louis‘s Washington University 
(medical)—have not transformed into high-tech communities.48 Both 
Pittsburgh and St. Louis rank at the bottom of Florida‘s tolerance scale.49 
Despite the difficulties that non-tech regions may have in attracting a 
steady stream of entrepreneurial talent that would rival existing-tech 
regions, it is sometimes the case that high-quality entrepreneurs are found 
in non-tech regions. The larger problem in these cases is that entrepreneurs 
cannot locate private venture capital.
50
 Because venture capital bucks 
global trends and still depends heavily on physical proximity, 
entrepreneurs must relocate to be near VCs (who, as will be discussed, are 
heavily concentrated in existing-tech regions).
51
 It may seem ironic that 
VCs still invest locally despite the diminishing importance of physical 
place brought about by technological advances and globalization. Yet on 
closer examination, we find good reasons for local investment. VCs are 
not passive investors; instead, they perform substantial due diligence on 
potential investments ex ante and monitor them very closely ex post.
52
 For 
instance, a partner from the VC firm typically sits on the board of each 
start-up that the firm funds.
53
 This intensive use of human resources is 
much easier from nearby than far away, especially considering that the VC 
will be invested in a diverse portfolio of start-up firms simultaneously. 
The risky and fast-paced nature of the start-up world also demands that 
VCs be able to gather information about their start-ups and respond 
quickly, which is facilitated by close physical proximity. 
 
 
 48. See Chong-Moon Lee et al., The Silicon Valley Habitat, in THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE, 
supra note 30, at 1, 2 (asking why the IT industry never took off in Pittsburg despite Carnegie 
Mellon‘s presence). 
 49. See FLORIDA, CREATIVE CLASS, supra note 47, at xxi (Pittsburg is fifth from last and Saint 
Louis is last on the tolerance index); see also FLORIDA, CITIES, supra note 47, at 42, 68 (citing the 
work of Robert Cushing and Robert Lucas/Edward Glaeser, respectively, for the proposition that 
regional competitiveness is determined by human capital). 
 50. See Steven L. Brooks, Comment, The Venture Capital Investment Act of 2001: Arkansas’s 
Vision for Economic Growth, 56 ARK. L. REV. 397, 400–01 (2003) (detailing high-tech innovations in 
Arkansas universities but arguing there is no funding for these ideas). 
 51. See infra Part III.A. 
 52. See, e.g., Mira Ganor, Improving the Legal Environment for Start-Up Financing By 
Rationalizing Rule 144, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2007). Venture capitalists (VCs) not 
only provide the essential private equity, but are also active investors of start-up companies. VCs 
mentor and monitor the companies in which they invest. They offer assistance and support in 
developing the business of their portfolio companies. VCs also have both the access and expertise 
needed to conduct effective monitoring. 
 53. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 106 (2005) 
(―VCs are active investors who often sit on the board of the portfolio companies, and sometimes even 
control the board.‖). 
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Therefore, VCs invest locally, and entrepreneurs in non-tech regions 
must move to existing-tech regions to obtain venture capital. I know of no 
empirical studies on the topic of entrepreneurial relocation, but at least 
based on anecdotal data, it happens. According to essayist, programmer, 
and frequent Silicon Valley commentator Paul Graham, Facebook could 
not raise money (in Boston, of all places) so it moved to Silicon Valley for 
funding.
54
 Another example comes from the State of Florida, where the 
legislature took up a proposal to create a state venture fund after over 
twenty-five Miami-based start-ups moved their headquarters after being 
unable to obtain local funding.
55
 Other recent examples of entrepreneurial 
relocation to Silicon Valley can also be found, although the reason for the 
move is not always apparent.
56
 A lack of local financing might not be the 
only, or the main, reason for entrepreneurial relocation. For instance, the 
lack of skilled employees who can fill out the start-up‘s ranks once it 
grows could cause a start-up to move to a labor market where skilled talent 
is more plentiful. 
While relocation may be a rational move for the entrepreneur, it is a 
severe detriment to local communities. Entrepreneurial relocation may or 
may not have social welfare effects in the aggregate, but it does keep 
distributional gains skewed toward existing high-tech regions. Consider 
how this happens. Relocation not only removes the promising start-up and 
its positive externalities (such as jobs in that particular start-up) from the 
non-tech region, it also deprives the region of future entrepreneurial talent. 
 
 
 54. See Paul Graham, Why to Move to a Startup Hub (Oct. 2007), http://www.paulgraham.com/ 
startuphubs.html (―Facebook was started in Boston. Boston VCs had the first shot at them. But they 
said no, so Facebook moved to Silicon Valley and raised money there. The partner who turned them 
down now says that ‗may turn out to have been a mistake.‘‖). But see BEN MEZRICH, THE 
ACCIDENTAL BILLIONAIRES: THE FOUNDING OF FACEBOOK, A TALE OF SEX, MONEY, GENIUS, AND 
BETRAYAL 152 (2009) (writing that VCs, although it‘s unclear from where, were following the 
Facebook founders to class at Harvard and that one particular guy in his ―midthirties, gray-suit-and-tie 
combination, suitcase under his arm . . . wasn‘t the first VC to track them down on campus; now that 
the spring semester was almost over and school was getting close to finished, they were coming at an 
almost frightening frequency‖). 
 55. See, e.g., Terrance P. McGuire, A Blueprint for Growth or a Recipe for Disaster? State 
Sponsored Venture Capital Funds for High Technology Ventures, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 424 
(1994).  
 56. See, e.g., Mobile Portal Startup Expands Leadership, Moves HQ to Silicon Valley, Adds 
Offices to Accommodate Rapid Growth and Support Partnership Strategy, MARKET WIRE, Feb. 2008, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_pwwi/is_200802/ai_n24272998 (discussing Berggi, a leading 
start-up in the mobile online applications and services market, which moved its headquarters from 
Houston to Silicon Valley); TFS Changes Name to Fox, Moves Headquarters to Silicon Valley, 
SILICON VALLEY/SAN JOSE BUS. J., May 3, 2005, http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2005/ 
05/02/daily16.html (company making e-mail firewall products moves its headquarters to Silicon 
Valley but will continue to operate its current offices in Herndon, Virginia, London, United Kingdom, 
and Uppsala, Sweden). 
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If the start-up were to receive local funding and prosper, it might attract 
other high-tech employees to the region, who could then spin-off their 
own ventures.
57
 Similarly, the original entrepreneur might become a serial 
entrepreneur and form another local start-up, help to develop local 
university-industry collaborations, or go on to become an angel investor.
58
 
When start-ups relocate, it prevents this chain of events. Therefore, if 
communities can keep their start-ups local, it can generate more local start-
ups and permit repeated bursts of innovation.
59
 But without funding for 
local start-ups, entrepreneurs will continue to relocate and any initial 
success will not be sustainable. 
III. FUNDING FOR LOCAL INNOVATION: THE DEFICIENCIES OF VENTURE 
CAPITAL 
Working from the assumption that financial capital is a significant 
problem for non-tech regions (whether or not the leading problem—a 
question which only empirical work can answer),
60
 this Part will explore 
the two sources of innovation funding that dominate the existing literature: 
private venture capital and, to a lesser extent, state-sponsored venture 
capital. It explains why private venture capital is not available for early-
stage start-ups in non-tech regions and why state substitutes have not 
proved to be successful alternatives. 
 
 
 57. See Homa Bahrami & Stuart Evans, Flexible Recycling and High-Technology 
Entrepreneurship, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra note 2, at 165, 175–76 (citing 
numerous examples of inter-firm movement in high technology).  
 58. See James F. Gibbons, The Role of Stanford University: A Dean’s Reflections, in THE 
SILICON VALLEY EDGE, supra note 30, at 200, 208 (―[E]ntrepreneurs tend to stay in areas in which 
their success in a previous start-up is a significant asset in hiring a new team, attracting other funding, 
and fulfilling the other conditions for a successful start-up.‖). 
 59. See generally Zoltán J. Acs et al., The Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship (Ctr. 
for Econ. Policy Research, Paper No. 5326, 2005). 
 60. The lack of local financial capital does get significant attention from planners and academics. 
For example, over twenty-five states have sought to stimulate high-tech growth, and their dominant 
focus has been on finding local capital for entrepreneurs rather than on finding the entrepreneurs 
themselves. See McGuire, supra note 55, at 427 (―[O]ver half of the states in the U.S. currently 
employ venture capital seed funds, grants or loan programs directed at high technology companies.‖). 
In addition, when examining international efforts to create new venture capital markets, Gilson focuses 
on the funding side of the equation. He assumes that if providers of risk capital and financial 
intermediaries can be put in place, waiting entrepreneurs will be forced to ―reveal themselves.‖ Gilson, 
supra note 23, at 1094 (―Here the hypothesis is simply that the presence of a venture capital 
framework complete with funding will induce entrepreneurs to reveal themselves.‖). 
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A. Private Venture Capital 
Private venture capital—venture capital not provided by governments, 
but by the private sector—has a proven record of success in funding high-
tech innovation. Private venture capital backed the Internet revolution of 
the 1990s and is now a driving force behind innovation in clear technology 
alternatives to fossil fuels. Under Gilson‘s venture capital market 
framework,
61
 the VCs (the general partners in the venture fund) technically 
fill only the financial intermediary role. However, their strong track 
records allow them to attract risk capital from pension funds, endowments, 
and wealthy individuals, who become the limited partners in the venture 
capital fund. Private VCs use their expertise to selectively deploy risk 
capital into the very best start-ups.
62
 When a start-up has an exit, the 
profits are returned to the fund investors minus the VC‘s management fee 
and
 
carry.
63
 The process recycles when fund investors reinvest their profits 
in new venture capital funds, which in turn invest in a new group of start-
ups.
64
 In addition to funding, private VCs offer start-ups critical value-
added services including advice on growth and exit strategies and 
connections to professional managerial talent.
65
  
When it comes to non-tech regions, however, private venture capital 
fails to deliver for two reasons. First, most start-ups in non-tech regions 
are likely to be in the early stages of development. Yet venture capital is 
increasingly being channeled to later-stage start-ups with some proven 
record of success. This is both because of the private VC‘s initial selection 
criteria and because a healthy portion of venture capital goes toward 
making follow-on investments in existing portfolio companies. In the first 
 
 
 61. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 62. Estimates are that only around one percent of the start-ups that seek venture capital are 
successful in obtaining it. See MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING: 
MATCHING START-UP FUNDS WITH START-UP COMPANIES—THE GUIDE FOR ENTREPRENEURS, 
INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS 146 (2000). For example, in 1997, a hot year for 
start-ups, leading venture capital firm Benchmark Partners funded only nine of the 1500 business plans 
submitted to them. RANDALL E. STROSS, EBOYS: THE TRUE STORY OF THE SIX TALL MEN WHO 
BACKED EBAY, WEBVAN, AND OTHER BILLION-DOLLAR START-UPS 24 (2000).  
 63. The management fee is typically two percent of the risk capital in the venture fund and the 
carry, or profits, is typically set at twenty percent. See Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of 
Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital Partnership, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3–27 (1999) (conducting 
an empirical study that found management fees of two to three percent and a large concentration of 
carry at twenty percent); see also Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in 
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008). 
 64. See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 3–4 (1999) 
(discussing the interrelatedness of each piece of venture capital investing). 
 65. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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instance, the private VC‘s preference for later-stage start-ups is a rational 
one. As noted, each investment requires the VC to undertake careful due 
diligence and post-investment monitoring, which in effect limits the 
number of investments a VC can make.
66
 The need to be highly selective 
leads VCs to favor more mature start-ups, which present less risk.
67
 Not 
surprisingly, the start-ups that do attract venture capital usually have an 
―in‖ through a business associate, lawyer, or angel investor.68  
The practice of investing in later-stage start-ups has become more 
pronounced as private VCs become victims of their own success. After 
some astronomical returns from Internet investments, investors are 
directing more and more funds to venture capital. But because sheer 
physical manpower continues to limit start-up investments, however, each 
start-up now receives more funds, and the private VC‘s initial financing 
round has spiked from $2 million to upwards of $5 million.
69
 This trend 
toward larger investments serves to further limit the pool of venture capital 
available to early-stage start-ups that need smaller, earlier infusions.
70
 
Second, and an even larger problem for non-tech regions, is that 
venture capital is often not available at all outside of existing-tech regions. 
Private VCs are heavily concentrated in existing-tech regions, most 
notably along Silicon Valley‘s Sand Hill Road. Data reveal that for the 
ten-year period from 1997–2006, 38.1% of all venture capital investments, 
 
 
 66. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 23 (―[V]enture capitalists are rarely able 
to fund small start-up firms . . ., regardless of the quality of the venture, because of the very specific 
investment criteria and high costs of due diligence, negotiating, and monitoring.‖). Even in the height 
of the dot-com era, when the joke was that any Stanford student with an idea could obtain venture 
capital, only twenty-eight percent of venture capital investments were directed at early-stage 
companies. Id. at 49 (citing a 1998 statistic). 
 67. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 1009 (2006) (―Many startups are unable to secure VC or other institutional 
financing in the first year or so of the business, when risk is highest.‖). 
 68. See Martin Kenney & Richard Florida, Venture Capital in Silicon Valley: Fueling New Firm 
Formation, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra note 2, at 98, 102 (―Venture capitalists 
receive an enormous number of business plans and fund only a very few. Usually, those funded arrive 
through recommendations.‖). 
 69. See John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to 
Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 
873–74 (2005) (explaining the ―$5 million minimum investment trend‖); Preston, supra note 46, at 68 
(venture capital investments are increasing from $2 million to $5 million); MIT ENTRE. CTR., 
VENTURE SUPPORT SYSTEMS PROJECT: ANGEL INVESTORS, 14 (2000), http://entrepreneurship.mit.edu/ 
Downloads/AngelReport.pdf [hereinafter MIT] (observing that VCs are funding larger and later stage 
deals by more established start-ups). 
 70. Smaller and earlier capital infusions are typically necessary for start-ups to reach the point 
where they can effectively use the larger investments. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra 
note 62, at 64 (―[F]ew firms can raise $5 million until they have raised up to $500,000 for their early 
growth and development.‖). 
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representing 42.6% of all venture capital dollars, were located in 
California.
71
 The next highest levels were in the 10% range, in 
Massachusetts (home of Route 128).
72
 Other states in the top ten received 
less than 5% of all venture capital funding.
73
 Also, while the boom times 
of the late 1990s may have sent some private VCs searching for 
investments in other regions, the data suggest that venture capital is now 
becoming even more concentrated in California. In 2006, California start-
ups received 42.3% of all venture capital investments, representing 48.0% 
of all venture capital dollars—a slight increase over the preceding ten-year 
average.
74
 Of course, there are good reasons for private VC 
concentration—namely economies of scale and the need for consistent 
deal flow—but that does not address the distributional problem that is this 
Article‘s focus. 
While it might seem that the subset of private VC funds specializing in 
early-stage investments would branch out to more open (and less 
competitive) markets, the geographic concentration of early-stage venture 
capital mirrors that of its later-stage counterparts.
75
 As noted, non-tech 
regions do produce at least some entrepreneurial talent, but private VCs 
have not typically branched out to these regions for a couple of reasons. 
First, there is often not enough entrepreneurial talent in non-tech regions 
to support the deal flow required to sustain a venture branch.
76
 Second, 
through the promise of funding and connections, private VCs are often 
able to lure the entrepreneurial talent that is found in non-tech regions to 
Silicon Valley. The resulting entrepreneurial relocation, which has been 
discussed, means that deserving entrepreneurs get funded—again my 
argument is not that the market for entrepreneurial finance is necessarily 
 
 
 71. See George Lipper, Nat‘l Ass‘n of Seed & Venture Funds NASVF Net News—Ten Year and 
$350B of Venture Capital State by State, Jan. 29, 2007; see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 64, 
at 14 (historical look at investment data shows a very high concentration of venture capital investment 
in California beginning in 1965 and remaining fairly constant over time). 
 72. See Lipper, supra note 71. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. It used to be that ―California‖ venture capital was synonymous with ―Silicon Valley‖ 
venture capital, although now Southern California enjoys one of the largest influxes of venture capital 
dollars in the country. See Matthew Garrahan, Silicon Valley Investors Discover LA’s Star Appeal, 
FIN. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bda46794-1198-11dd-a93b-0000779fd2ac. 
html?nclick_check=1; while Los Angeles boasts a strong media focus, Orange County is home to 
medical devices and software, and San Diego is strong in biotech. 
 75. See Lipper, supra note 71. But see Steve Jurvetson, Changing Everything: The Internet 
Revolution and Silicon Valley, in THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE, supra note 30, at 124, 125 (noting that 
the early-stage VC Draper Fisher Jurvetson has opened branches in a number of U.S. cities). 
 76. See Kenney & Florida, supra note 68, at 122 (quoting Don Valentine, the founder of leading 
venture capital firm Sequoia Capital, for the proposition that outside of Silicon Valley, Boston is the 
only other consistent source of good deal flow). 
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inefficient—but they only get funded after moving to existing-tech 
regions. 
B. State-Sponsored Venture Capital 
Because private venture capital is not available in non-tech regions, or 
for early-stage start-ups, over half of the states have adopted or considered 
adopting some form of state-sponsored venture capital fund.
77
 While some 
of these funds have produced decent returns,
78
 state funds have not proven 
to be the answer to the local funding problem, and with good reason. 
If a state program envisions the state as a direct investor in start-ups, 
we encounter Gilson‘s problem of an improper financial intermediary—
one without the relevant expertise or market incentives for investment.
79
 
Consider why private VCs are such reliable financial intermediaries. Ex 
ante investment, private VCs have the expertise to evaluate entrepreneurs 
and the market potential of their ideas. In addition, an increasing trend 
toward sector-specific investments furthers the private VC‘s informational 
advantage over other investors.
80
 Ex post investment, private VCs are 
value-added investors that offer expert advice on growth and exit 
strategies, large rolodexes of professional managers, customers, suppliers, 
and investment banks, and the discipline to improve start-up governance.
81
 
State VCs fail in all of these respects, however. Government employees do 
not have the private VC‘s expertise in picking the most promising start-
ups ex ante or providing them with value-added services ex post. State 
VCs could try to measure up by hiring qualified fund managers from the 
private sector, but it is unlikely they could match the compensation levels 
found in private funds, leaving a market for lemons among the fund 
managers who would accept positions running state VC funds.
82
  
 
 
 77. McGuire, supra note 55, at 420. 
 78. See id. at 427 (noting that the Massachusetts and Michigan funds ―are widely regarded as the 
premier programs in the state venture capital field‖). 
 79. See Gilson, supra note 23, at 1070. 
 80. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 149. 
 81. See Joshua Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the Decision to Go Public, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 
314 (1994) (on the ability of VCs to offer advice on the most profitable time for exit); D. Gordon 
Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 
139–40 (1998) (discussing the VC‘s value-added services); Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, Venture 
Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms: Empirical Evidence (AFA 2001 New Orleans 
Sauder Sch. of Bus. Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=243149 (on the improved 
governance of venture-backed start-ups). 
 82. McGuire, supra note 55, at 445 (―Existing state programs presently offer compensation well 
below that offered by comparable private firms, and boosting compensation to a competitive level is 
likely to be difficult given limited state resources.‖). 
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State VCs also lack market incentives for investment. While successful 
programs may help politicians earn reelection, government employees do 
not depend on rates of return for their compensation.
83
 Conversely, the 
private VC‘s two-pronged compensation structure—carry that increases 
proportionate to start-up success and management fees that increase with 
the ability to attract more risk capital—highly incentivizes the private VC 
to find and develop the best start-ups. State VCs may have more incentive 
to select start-ups for political reasons,
84
 including immediate, if 
unsustainable, job creation.
85
 
The discussion so far has assumed a state-sponsored venture capital 
fund making direct investments in portfolio companies. A better 
alternative is for states to provide matching funds to private VCs. In other 
words, this is a private VC solution, with states supplying the risk capital 
instead of, or in addition to, the usual private VC fund investors. The 
hypothesis is that private VCs will be enticed to enter an underserved state 
by the promise of risk capital, and that the state‘s deficiencies in incentives 
and expertise are cured by allowing knowledgeable investors to select and 
mold the portfolio companies.
86
 This structure recognizes the inability of 
states to both provide risk capital and invest it, and confines their role to 
the former. 
This indirect structure, while preferable to direct state investments, is 
still problematic for several reasons. First, putting the private VC buffer 
between states and start-ups does not mean that the private VC‘s 
investment decisions will be free from state influence. States may put 
indirect pressure on private VCs to select politically agreeable start-ups, 
and private VCs who incur sunk costs in moving to the state may cave in 
to the pressure to keep state funds coming.
87
 Also, government 
 
 
 83. See Gilson, supra note 23, at 1094–96 (attributing Germany‘s failure to build a venture 
capital community to factors including a lack of incentives to select and monitor portfolio 
investments). 
 84. See McGuire, supra note 55, at 446–47 (noting that political considerations have caused 
problems with state-sponsored funds in Virginia and Alaska); Merrill F. Hoopengardner, Note, 
Nontraditional Venture Capital: An Economic Development Strategy for Alaska, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 
357, 371 (2003) (observing that political pressures push state fund managers to make non-optimal 
investments). 
 85. See McGuire, supra note 55, at 435 (unlike VCs, states may focus on local benefits such as 
job creation at the expense of rates of return); Hoopengardner, supra note 84, at 369–70 (associating 
lower rates of return with an attempt to serve a ―double bottom line‖).  
 86. See Gilson, supra note 23, at 1097 (arguing that Israel‘s attempt to build a venture capital 
community was admirable in part because the government fund invested in a venture capital 
intermediary rather than directly in portfolio investments, and did not help to select those investments). 
 87. Id. at 1100 (in an indirect set-up, ―government still might try to influence the selection of 
portfolio companies (and the interaction between the venture capital fund and the portfolio company) 
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investments involve more red tape than investments from endowments, 
pension funds, and wealthy individuals, and could expose notoriously 
secretive private VCs to public disclosure of their investments and 
returns.
88
 Finally, for these reasons, it is unlikely that the best private VCs 
will avail themselves of state funds, leaving a market for lemons among 
the private VCs who will accept state funds. The relatively small size of 
state funds, resulting in lower VC compensation, exacerbates the lemons 
problem.
89
 
The foregoing is not to suggest that states do not have a role to play in 
tech-driven economic development. Recent financial events, such as the 
collapse of Wall Street firms and their bailout by the federal government, 
have shown that a hard dichotomy cannot be drawn between governments 
and markets in economic matters. The foregoing criticism of state-
sponsored venture capital programs simply suggests that governments may 
be more effective in promoting tech-driven economic development by 
other means, some of which are discussed in Part V, while others are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
IV. FUNDING FOR LOCAL INNOVATION: THE PROMISE OF ANGEL 
INVESTOR GROUPS 
The prior Part discussed the deficiencies in private venture capital and 
state-sponsored alternatives in funding entrepreneurs in non-tech regions. 
This Part moves into fresh territory by suggesting a more promising 
alternative: angel investor groups. It begins by defining ―angel investors‖ 
and offering an historical look at the role that individual angel investors—
the dominant model of angel investing until the last decade—played in 
creating Silicon Valley and the early venture capital industry. It then 
favorably compares the new face of angel investing—angel investor 
groups—to venture capital (whether private or state-sponsored) as a 
funding source for innovation in non-tech regions. Finally, recognizing 
that private VC still has an extremely important role to play in funding 
innovation, this Part constructs an argument, grounded in signaling theory, 
for how angel groups might attract private VCs to follow them into non-
tech regions. 
 
 
informally through the implicit promise of future government funding‖). 
 88. Even public pension funds are facing calls in some states to disclose information about their 
venture fund investments under public-record disclosure laws and through Freedom of Information 
Act requests. See Pamela A. MacLean, Seeking a View into Venture Capital Funds: Public Pensions, 
Schools Want Data, NAT‘L L.J., Jan. 12, 2006, at 1. 
 89. See McGuire, supra note 55, at 445. 
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A. Angel Investing: Definition and History 
Defining an ―angel investor‖ is no easy task. Angel investors are 
typically defined as wealthy individuals, ―accredited investors‖ under the 
securities laws, who invest personal funds in high-tech start-ups.
90
 If we 
further limit the definition to those individuals who acquired their wealth 
and an appetite for start-up investments from being ex-entrepreneurs, we 
confine ourselves to a relatively narrow class of individuals. A more 
expansive definition also includes individuals who invest in ―lifestyle‖ 
firms of a non-technical nature founded by friends or family. While the 
more professional angels might make per-start-up investments ranging 
from $100,000 to a few million dollars for some extremely wealthy 
individuals,
91
 the friends and family-type angel variety might invest only a 
few thousand dollars. Because there are far more angels than VCs, and 
angels on the whole collectively invest in thirty to forty times more start-
ups,
92
 the aggregate angels market is said to match the aggregate venture 
capital market at $25 billion per year.
93
  
Until the last decade, angel investors operated individually or in small 
syndicates. Angel investing was more of an informal, hobby-like activity 
than a professional endeavor. Still, informal angel investing financed 
many of the foundational start-ups in Silicon Valley and Route 128. Until 
the formal venture capital industry came about in the late 1960s, 
individual angels were a common source of innovation funding in Silicon 
 
 
 90. See Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 74 (1998) (noting that angels who participate in the SBA‘s electronic 
matching services for entrepreneurs and capital providers, ACE-Net, must meet the SEC‘s definition 
of an accredited investor); MIT STUDY, supra note 69, at 10 (―[T]he term ‗angel‘ or ‗business angel‘ 
refers to high net worth individuals, usually ‗accredited‘ investors as defined by SEC Rule 501, who 
invest in and support start-up companies in their early stages of growth.‖). 
 91. John Freear et al., Angels: Personal Investors in the Venture Capital Market, 7 ENTRE. & 
REGIONAL DEV. 85, 87 (1995) (―A typical angel deal is an early-stage round in the US$100,000 to 
US$500,000 range, raised from six or eight investors.‖); Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. Angel and Venture 
Capital Market: Recent Trends and Developments, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Spring 2003, at 7, 13 
[hereinafter Recent Trends and Developments] (―The typical angel deal is an early-stage round (seed 
or start-up) in the $100,000 to $2 million range . . . .‖). 
 92. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 69. Angels fund more new firms because 
there are more angels and because VCs devote more of their funds to existing portfolio companies. See 
id. at 67 (―[V]enture capitalists spend around two-thirds of their funds on expansion funding of their 
existing portfolio firms.‖); Jeffrey E. Sohl, The Early-Stage Equity Market in the USA, 1 VENTURE 
CAP. 101, 108 (1999) [hereinafter Early-Stage Equity Market] (many venture capital financings are for 
start-ups in which they have previously invested).  
 93. See The Angel Investor Market in 2006: The Angel Market Continues Steady Growth, 
http://www.unh.edu/cvr (citing total angel investments in 2006 at $25.6B).  
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Valley.
94
 If we begin Silicon Valley‘s history with the founding of the 
Hewlett-Packard Company (HP) in 1938, we learn that HP‘s founders 
were not only mentored by Frederick Terman, but that he was an angel 
investor in the company.
95
 If we date Silicon Valley‘s beginnings back 
even earlier to the founding of Federal Telegraph Company (FTC) in 
1909,
96
 we learn that the initial funding for FTC was provided by Stanford 
president David Starr Jordan and several Stanford faculty members, all 
angel investors.
97
 Later Silicon Valley start-ups continued to receive angel 
finance, including Intel, which counted Arthur Rock among its personal 
investors.
98
 Individual angel investors were also an early source of finance 
in Boston. For example, Alexander Graham Bell was able to start the Bell 
Telephone Company in Boston in 1877 after receiving two angel 
investments.
99
  
Individual angels not only helped to create Silicon Valley and Route 
128 through their funding of high-tech start-ups, they also played an 
important role in creating the formal venture capital industry.
100
 The best 
summary of how angel investors transformed individual investing into 
formal financial intermediation comes from Martin Kenney and Richard 
Florida.
101
 Kenney and Florida describe how a group of young angel 
investors (who unimaginatively called themselves ―The Group‖) began 
 
 
 94. Kenney & Florida, supra note 68, at 98 (―Until the late 1950s, an entrepreneur in the San 
Francisco Bay Area depended on informal investors for small-scale funding.‖); id. at 105 (―[I]n the 
aftermath of World War II the San Francisco Bay Area was the home to a number of promising young 
electronics companies, and there were individuals willing to invest in new ventures.‖); Kvamme, supra 
note 46, at 65 (angel investors from the East Coast were still an important source of funding for Silicon 
Valley companies in the late 1960s before the founding of the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins in 
1972). 
 95. See Gibbons, supra note 58, at 215–16. 
 96. See Sturgeon, supra note 2, at 19–29 (arguing that the real start of Silicon Valley dates back 
to the founding of FTC). 
 97. The Evolution of Silicon Valley, in THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE, supra note 30, at 153, 153 
(―[O]ne might start [the history of Silicon Valley] with the founding of the Federal Telegraph 
Company, a radio operating company, in 1909 (with David Starr Jordan, the president of Stanford, as, 
in current terminology, an angel investor).‖); Leslie, supra note 2, at 51 (noting that several Stanford 
faculty members joined Jordan in making angel investments in FTC). 
 98. Dado P. Banatao & Kevin A. Fong, The Valley of Deals: How Venture Capital Helped 
Shaped the Region, in THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE, supra note 30, at 295, 297. 
 99. ROSEGRANT & LAMPE, supra note 26, at 65 (When Bell needed money to complete his early 
experiments, the fathers of two deaf children he had taught to speak—Boston attorney Gardiner 
Greene Hubbard and Salem leather merchant Thomas Sanders—helped out, and later put up the capital 
to form the Bell Telephone Company in Boston in August 1877).  
 100. While some wealthy individuals such as Pittsburg billionaire Henry Hillman now fund 
innovation by becoming limited partners in venture capital funds (Hillman was an early investor in 
Kleiner Perkins; see PERKINS, supra note 25, at 106), many others continue to invest directly in start-
ups as angels.  
 101. See Kenney & Florida, supra note 68, at 106. 
  
 
 
 
 
2010] FINANCING THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY 741 
 
 
 
 
investing together in Silicon Valley start-ups in the mid-1950s.
102
 These 
angels, including Reid Dennis, William Bryan, William Edwards, William 
Bowes, and Daniel McGanney, soon had more investment opportunities 
than personal capital.
103
 The federal government presented a solution to 
this problem in 1958 when it created the Small Business Investment 
Corporation (SBIC), which offered matching federal funds for private 
investments.
104
 The SBIC program caught on with members of The Group, 
as well as other individuals and financial institutions, for the simple reason 
that it permitted more investments with less personal risk.
105
 Therefore, 
while Boston‘s American Research and Development may have been the 
first venture capital fund, it was the individual angel investors‘ use of the 
government‘s SBIC program that popularized financial intermediation for 
innovation funding.
106
 
In light of these early successes, it is somewhat of a puzzle why 
informal angel investing has not spurred even more high-tech 
transformations. But the reason becomes clear when considering how 
informal operation suffers from two major deficiencies. First, the informal 
angel‘s lack of concern with deal flow and preference for anonymity 
results in high search costs for entrepreneurs.
107
 Informal angels do not 
advertise to avoid being inundated with business plans, instead preferring 
to learn of potential investments through family members or business 
associates.
108
 This informal, back-channel mode of operation has led to the 
description of individual angel investing as an ―invisible‖ market.109 
 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 106–07; Emilio J. Castilla et al., Social Networks in Silicon Valley, in THE SILICON 
VALLEY EDGE, supra note 30, at 218, 235 (observing that former student of Georges Doriot and 
entrepreneur Frank Chambers pioneered the use of the SBIC in Northern California); ROSEGRANT & 
LAMPE, supra note 26, at 120–21 (noting the use of SBICs by financial institutions). 
 106. As with military funding discussed supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text, the SBIC 
program should not be seen as an attempt to centrally plan the development of any particular high-tech 
region in the way that the Research Triangle Park in North Carolina was centrally planned. See supra 
notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Freear et al., supra note 91, at 86 (―There are no directories of business angels and no 
public records of their investment transactions.‖). By way of contrast, Pratt’s Guide to Private Equity 
gives information on all venture capital firms, and venture capital firms of any repute boast glossy 
websites. See Orcutt, supra note 69, at 889 (―From the entrepreneur‘s standpoint, formal VC funds are 
not very difficult to find. Numerous sources exist that identify the formal VC funds and provide their 
contact information.‖) (citation omitted). 
 108. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 144. 
 109. See Freear et al., supra note 91, at 86 (angels ―are a nearly invisible segment of the venture 
capital markets‖); William E. Wetzel, Jr., Angels and Informal Risk Capital, SLOAN MGMT. REV., 
Summer 1983, at 23, 24. 
  
 
 
 
 
742 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:717 
 
 
 
 
Several scholars have argued that the informal angel‘s preference for 
anonymity led to a haphazard and inefficient funding process.
110
  
The second disadvantage of informal angel investing comes from the 
wide variation in the quality of angel funding.
111
 Some angel funding came 
from professional angels (i.e., successful ex-entrepreneurs), but much did 
not, instead coming from friends and family-type angels or lawyers, 
accountants, and investors of inherited wealth.
112
 These differences in 
quality can have several negative ramifications for entrepreneurs. Ex ante, 
low-quality angels may lack the expertise necessary to select the most 
promising start-ups. This market failure can be particularly pronounced 
when angels decide to invest as a favor to friends or family rather than on 
a critical evaluation of the start-up‘s prospects. Ex post, those 
entrepreneurs funded by low-quality angels will not receive the same 
value-added services that high-quality angels can provide. Because value-
added services can be more important than money in determining a start-
up‘s success,113 the failure to obtain value-added services could result in 
the failure of even high-quality entrepreneurs.  
B. The New Face of Angel Investing: Angel Investor Groups 
A sea change in angel investing has put a new, professional face on the 
practice and now offers more hope for financing the next Silicon Valley. 
Angels are increasingly abandoning informal operation in favor of 
organization into regional angel investor groups.
114
 Possible reasons for 
the change include the desire for more consistent deal flow, increased 
opportunities to interact with other angels and VCs, and the potential to 
 
 
 110. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation 
and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004) (suggesting that early-stage 
markets are inefficient because of high information asymmetries). 
 111. See Hellmann, supra note 34, at 291 (―There is much heterogeneity among angel investors 
. . . .‖). 
 112. This is an assumption based on my conversations with angel investors coupled with the 
relatively small amount of angel investing now done through angel groups, which tend to attract the 
most professional angels in a region. See infra notes 126–28 and accompanying text (on the most 
professional angels joining angel groups) and infra note 143 and accompanying text (on the relatively 
small percentage of angel funding that comes from these groups). 
 113. Carol M. Sands, The Angels’ Forum and The Halo Fund: The Rise of the Professional Angel, 
in STATE OF THE ART, supra note 46, at 32, 39 (angel group members ―believe that the time they have 
invested in our portfolio companies is a much more important asset than our dollars‖); VAN 
OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 65 (angels‘ value-added services are ―priceless for 
young entrepreneurs starting out and would not normally be affordable by other means‖). 
 114. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1405, 1443–46 (2008). 
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pool capital into larger investments that will justify the transaction costs of 
preferred stock.
115
 
Since the first notable angel group was founded in 1994 (Silicon 
Valley‘s Band of Angels), over 150 more angel groups have been 
formed.
116
 There is at least one angel group in each state, and many states 
are home to multiple groups. Collectively, those angel groups that enjoy 
full membership in the Angel Capital Association (ACA) include 6760 
member angels.
117
 Angel group members still invest personal funds, 
although some of the larger groups have also established ―sidecar‖ funds 
to co-invest in the group‘s most attractive deals.118 ACA data reveals that 
the average angel group invested $265,926 per start-up in 2007.
119
 Also, 
while individual angels invest in anywhere from one to four start-ups per 
year (and probably closer to one),
120
 the average angel group invested in 
4.5 new start-ups in 2007.
121
  
Angel groups are professionalizing the practice of angel investing. In 
the process, they are removing the two main drawbacks of informal angel 
investing. First, while informal angels prefer anonymity, angel groups are 
exactly the opposite. Most of them have their own websites, like VCs, and 
are also easily found through a few clicks on the ACA‘s website.122 Angel 
group websites often contain instructions for entrepreneurs on how to 
submit business plans for the angel group‘s consideration.123 In addition, 
angel groups hold workshops for entrepreneurs in their local communities 
to educate them on how to become attractive candidates for funding. As 
 
 
 115. Id. at 1443. 
 116. The Angel Capital Association (ACA), the professional alliance of angel groups, counts 147 
full-member groups as of April 2008 and an additional thirty-seven partial or non-member groups. 
These and other figures in this paragraph are from ACA statistics prepared for ACA‘s Annual Summit 
held May 7–9, 2008, in San Diego, California [hereinafter ACA Statistics] and on file with Author. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Sands, supra note 113, at 39 (Silicon Valley‘s Angels‘ Forum created ―The Halo Fund in 
2000 [which] allowed our friends and family members as well as institutional investors to co-invest in 
the group‘s best deals‖). 
 119. See 2008 ACA ANGEL GROUP CONFIDENCE REPORT (2008), available at http://www.angel 
capitalassociation.org/dir_about/news_detail.aspx?id=179 [hereinafter ACA CONFIDENCE REPORT]. 
These and other statistics are only for the angel groups that reported data to the ACA, which 
introduces selection bias. 
 120. See Ibrahim, supra note 114, at 1424 & nn.90–91. 
 121. ACA CONFIDENCE REPORT, supra note 119. Reporting angel groups also made an average of 
2.8 follow-on investments in existing portfolio companies, leading to a total of 7.3 investments per 
group in 2007. Id. 
 122. http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/ (click on ―ABOUT ACA,‖ followed by ―ACA 
Member Directory,‖ then select any geographic area or angel group). 
 123. For example, the front page of the Tech Coast Angels website has a link that allows 
entrepreneurs to ―APPLY FOR FUNDING.‖ http://www.techcoastangels.com (last visited Mar. 11, 
2010). 
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one prominent angel has said, ―angel groups attract high-potential 
companies because entrepreneurs are aware of these groups.‖124 For these 
reasons, angel groups stand in stark contrast to their informal angel 
counterparts in that they operate in a highly visible market. The high 
visibility of angel groups reduces search costs for entrepreneurs.
125
 
Second, on average, angel group members are of higher quality than 
informal angels. On an individual basis, angel groups attract the most 
professional, businesslike angels in a region.
126
 Angel groups attract 
members looking for deal flow, thereby excluding angels who want to 
fund only friends or family. The latter group is most likely to include the 
low-quality angels who are ill-equipped to select the best start-ups for 
funding ex ante or add value for entrepreneurs ex post. In addition, a small 
number of angel groups limit membership to those angels with expertise in 
a particular industry, furthering these advantages over general investors.
127
 
Some angel groups that do not limit membership by industry do limit 
membership to angels with technical experience and thereby exclude 
lawyers, accountants, and other ―non-techies.‖128  
Perhaps more importantly, angel groups are able to offer entrepreneurs 
a higher-quality experience due to their advantages as a collective. Angel 
group members will be diverse in terms of their technical expertise (in the 
case of non-industry specific groups) and entrepreneurial experiences (in 
all groups). But because the angel group brings them all together under 
one umbrella, the group as a collective has advantages in selecting the best 
start-ups ex ante and adding value ex post.
129
 It is likely that at least some 
member of the angel group is an expert in the entrepreneur‘s technical 
field and can evaluate the quality of the entrepreneur‘s start-up.130 In 
 
 
 124. Preston, supra note 46, at 68. 
 125. See Smith, supra note 81, at 162–73 (observing the Web‘s potential to reduce search costs for 
entrepreneurs seeking funding). 
 126. Ibrahim, supra note 114, at 1444 (some angel groups require technical or industry expertise 
for admission). 
 127. See, e.g., Norm Sokoloff, Tenex Medical Investors: Niche Investing, in STATE OF THE ART, 
supra note 46, at 42, 44 (members of Silicon Valley‘s Tenex Medical Investors have ―substantial life 
science expertise‖).  
 128. Hans Severiens, The Band of Angels: The Origins of Collaboration, in STATE OF THE ART, 
supra note 46, at 18, 22 (the Band of Angels‘ ―organizing committee made it clear right from the start 
that membership in our group would be limited to those with high-tech credentials, and thus lawyers, 
bankers, real estate developers, and so on were not the kind of members we were seeking‖). 
 129. Most angel groups do not invest as a collective, instead allowing group members to pick and 
choose among the start-ups that come before the group. Ibrahim, supra note 114, at 1445. However, 
group members have financial and non-financial incentives to help each other out both pre- and post-
investment. 
 130. See Severiens, supra note 128, at 22 (―We insist that each serious investment opportunity 
have a sponsor from within the group; if that sponsor is another respected ‗techie,‘ those of us 
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addition, the collective wisdom of the group can be called upon to help 
entrepreneurs through growing pains after funding.
131
 It is likely that some 
angel in the group has dealt with a similar problem before. Individual 
angels, even when they invest in syndicates, do not possess the same depth 
or breadth of experience. 
C. Comparing Angel Groups to Venture Capital 
In this Part we have seen the historical importance of informal angel 
investors in building our two most important high-tech communities and 
their financial infrastructures, but also that certain drawbacks have 
prevented angel investing from making inroads in more regions. We have 
also seen that angel groups, as the new, professional face of angel 
investing, do not suffer from the same drawbacks as their informal 
predecessors. This Part will now compare angel group finance to venture 
capital, both private and state-sponsored, as a possible source of 
entrepreneurial finance for start-ups in new regions. It argues that angel 
groups possess several advantages over venture capital which are 
particularly acute in non-tech regions. These advantages are: wide 
geographic distribution and a preference for local investments; a 
preference for early-stage start-ups; market incentives to fund start-ups 
that will offer the best rate of return; and, because angel group investors 
are typically successful ex-entrepreneurs, relevant expertise in technology 
funding. Each of these advantages will now be discussed in turn. 
When it comes to funding innovation in non-tech regions, the first 
advantage of angel groups is their wide geographic distribution. Angel 
groups are located throughout the country rather than confined to existing 
high-tech communities like private VCs. Mark Van Osnabrugge and 
Robert Robinson, who conducted a large-scale study and literature review 
on angels, make the point that ―angels can be found everywhere, not just 
in major financial centers.‖132 There are good reasons why angels end up 
 
 
unfamiliar with the specifics of a market or a technology trust that it must be an opportunity worth 
exploring.‖); Sokoloff, supra note 127, at 45 (―The due diligence investigational process is shared in 
that the network relies on the expertise of individual members or their contacts.‖); William H. Payne, 
Tech Coast Angels: An Alliance of Angel Networks, in STATE OF THE ART, supra note 46, at 54, 55 
(―When you increase the number of angels in a group, you broaden the breadth of experience among 
the group‘s members and increase deal flow.‖). 
 131. See Sands, supra note 113, at 39 (―If there is a problem [with an investment], the group helps 
the involved members identity which people to ask for guidance (this is where the broad skills and 
resources of the group become very important) and what actions to take.‖). 
 132. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 65 (citation omitted). But see Sohl, Early-
Stage Equity Market, supra note 92, at 113 (arguing that the angel market is more vibrant in some 
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being located in more regions than private VCs. Private VCs must locate 
in existing-tech regions to obtain a steady deal flow and earn their 
compensation. Angels, on the other hand, enjoy geographic flexibility 
because they are independently wealthy and do not depend on returns from 
angel investing for their income.
133
 Angels can therefore afford to live in 
regions with less deal flow, and in turn choose to live in places they hail 
from, earned their degrees, or simply enjoy living. 
An important corollary to the angels‘ wide geographic distribution is 
their preference for making investments locally in the regions where they 
live. Local investment means the flow of angel finance to far more regions 
than venture capital. This bodes well for high-tech development in those 
regions. According to Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, the wide range of 
angel locales ―is particularly important for regional development since 
many angels elect to invest in a firm within a few hours‘ drive of their 
homes, thereby helping to retain and recirculate wealth within geographic 
areas.‖134 Angels invest locally for two main reasons. One, local 
investment permits easy monitoring, the same reason that private VCs 
invest locally.
135
 Two, an important, non-financial motivation for angel 
investing is the chance for routine participation in start-up development, 
which would not be possible without close proximity.
136
 In sum, angel 
group investing, like venture capital, is a regional practice, but angel 
groups operate in far more regions. 
The angel groups‘ second advantage is that they channel most 
investments to early-stage start-ups, which will comprise the vast majority 
of start-ups in non-tech regions. A typical angel investment comes during 
the period after the entrepreneur‘s friends‘ and family‘s money runs out 
but before private VCs will invest.
137
 Angels are to some extent limited to 
the early stages by investing their own cash, but the early stages also offer 
 
 
regions than others, including emerging markets in ―North Carolina, Colorado, the Pacific Northwest, 
Austin, Texas, and central Utah‖). 
 133. MIT STUDY, supra note 69, at 14 (―Angels enjoy the adrenaline rush of emerging company 
volatility, but without the 80-hour workweeks and the burden of ultimate responsibility for the 
company.‖). 
 134. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 65–66 (citations omitted). 
 135. See Stephen Prowse, Angel Investors and the Market for Angel Investments, 22 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 785, 789 & n.5 (1998). 
 136. See Ibrahim, supra note 114, at 1439 (discussing participation in the start-up‘s development 
as one of the main non-financial motivations for angel investment). But cf. id. at 1449 (observing that 
the chance for participation in a start-up‘s development may be less important to angel group 
investors). 
 137. Angel groups do have the potential, through the pooling of resources, to constitute a more 
important funding source for entrepreneurs that require larger cash infusions. See Preston, supra note 
46, at 68. 
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their preferred risk/return ratio.
138
 But angels also lose their advantages as 
value-added investors as start-ups mature. In the early stages, angels can 
offer seasoned advice on initial development strategies, empathy on 
growing pains, and assistance on obtaining future funding. In the later 
stages, private VCs have the comparative advantage in advising on the 
most profitable exit strategy or using connections to recruit professional 
managerial talent. 
The foregoing advantages of angel groups are enjoyed over private 
VCs. But angel groups also remedy state VC‘s main deficiencies—
namely, the inability to combine Gilson‘s risk capital and financial 
intermediary functions necessary for successful innovation funding. The 
key trait of most sophisticated angels, the type most likely to be found in 
angel groups, is that they are overwhelmingly ex-entrepreneurs. Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson estimated that over three-quarters of angel 
investors are prior entrepreneurs, compared to only one-third of private 
VCs.
139
 The entrepreneurial path to angel investing allows angels to 
combine the provision of risk capital with its knowledgeable investment in 
ways that state VCs cannot.  
Consider the reasons for this. First, a successful exit from a prior start-
up means large financial returns to the entrepreneur-turned-angel, who 
then has the financial means to invest in new start-ups. As a result of a 
successful entrepreneurial experience, angels can supply their own risk 
capital to new entrepreneurs.
140
 Second, entrepreneurial experience 
provides angels with the expertise to act as the equivalent of 
knowledgeable financial intermediaries. Pre-investment, the technical 
expertise that often goes hand-in-hand with being a former entrepreneur 
enables the angel to evaluate the potential of other start-ups. Post-
investment, the angel‘s prior hands-on experience running a start-up 
makes her a seasoned expert when it comes to advising other 
entrepreneurs on how to do the same. Finally, as private actors, angels also 
possess the private VC‘s market incentives for success. Although angels 
 
 
 138. See Ibrahim, supra note 114, at 1406 (Angels build the ―financial bridge‖ from friends and 
family money to venture capital). 
 139. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 108 (concluding that seventy-five to 
eighty-three percent of angels have prior start-up experience); id. at 110 (concluding that the majority 
of VCs are ―financial-investor types‖); see also John Freear et al., Angels and Non-Angels: Are There 
Differences?, 9 J. BUS. VENTURING 109, 111 (1994) (citing studies for the proposition that a majority 
of angels ―have entrepreneurial experience as owners or managers‖); Sohl, Early-Stage Equity Market, 
supra note 92, at 108 (claiming that the majority of angels are ―self-made millionaires, first generation 
money, and are individuals with substantial business and entrepreneurial experience‖). With all of 
these studies, it is unclear exactly how broadly ―angel‖ is defined. 
 140. To a certain extent, angels do not have VC levels of available finance. 
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invest for non-financial as well as financial reasons, and while angels do 
not depend in the same way on start-up returns for their compensation, 
they are first and foremost driven by the desire for profit.
141
 Some angels 
have remarked on their dislike for the ―angel‖ moniker because it suggests 
an altruistic aim rather than a profit motive.
142
  
Despite these theoretical advantages of angel groups over venture 
capital, concerns remain about their ability to translate into financing for 
the next Silicon Valley. Most significantly, angel groups still constitute a 
very small percentage of all angel investments—perhaps less than 2% of 
the entire angels market.
143
 Jeffrey Sohl, who conducts extensive research 
on angels, attributes as much as 30% of the angels market to angel groups, 
but it is unclear how he arrives at that figure.
144
 It must be stressed that 
angel groups are still quite new, and we might expect them to occupy a 
larger share of the angels market in time. The trend is certainly moving in 
that direction. However, their presently limited supply of risk capital poses 
problems when looking beyond the early stages of a start-up‘s 
development. These problems, and possible cures, are the subject of the 
next Section. 
D. The Signaling Function of Angel Group Finance 
The inability of angel groups to supply enough capital to take many, if 
not most, start-ups beyond the early stages means that private venture 
capital is still needed, just at a later time. While software and internet 
companies may be becoming exceptions, where angel financing alone is 
sufficient to reach exit due to reduced development costs in these fields, 
private venture capital will still be necessary in the life sciences and clean 
tech fields, where costs are considerably higher. Further, private venture 
capital is often necessary not only for its risk capital, but also for the 
private VC‘s unique set of value-added services. Venture capital dollars 
and value-added services take promising start-ups from their early stages 
 
 
 141. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 116–17. 
 142. Id. at 117. 
 143. Using the ACA‘s 2007 statistics discussed supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text, only 
6760 of two million estimated angels belong to angel groups. Moreover, multiplying the average angel 
group investments of $265,926 by an average of 7.3 investments per group times 145 angel groups 
yields a total angel group investment figure of under $282 million—less than 1.2% of the aggregate 
angels market of $25 billion. And this figure is probably high because the reporting groups are 
probably the bigger ones who make more and larger investments. 
 144. See Hannah Clark, Are Angel Investors Heaven-Sent?, FORBES, May 4, 2006, http://www. 
forbes.com/entrepreneurs/2006/05/04/entrepreneurs-finance-angels-cx_hc_0504angel.html (quoting 
Professor Sohl for the thirty-percent figure). 
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to exit through sale or initial public offering (IPO). Therefore, for start-ups 
to reach a successful exit, angel groups will often need to attract private 
venture capital to follow them into the start-up. This Part constructs an 
argument, grounded in signaling theory, for how angel groups could 
attract private VCs to non-tech regions. 
Signaling is an important concept in the financing literature because of 
the information asymmetries that exist between companies and potential 
investors.
145
 A signal ―is any piece of information capable of altering an 
observer‘s probability distribution of unobserved variables.‖146 To put the 
concept less technically, and to bring it into the start-up context, a signal is 
a shorthand way to assess the quality of a start-up without doing hundreds 
of hours of independent due diligence on the start-up. Signals are 
commonly used in investment decisions where information asymmetries 
exist between firms and outside investors. In the case of high-tech start-
ups, where information asymmetries are particularly severe due to a start-
up‘s lack of operating history and scientific nature, investment decisions 
by other, well-respected investors can signal start-up quality to potential 
investors. Before moving on to angel groups, it is useful to consider what 
has been observed about private VCs and signaling.  
Private VCs play a two-sided role in signaling, i.e., they both send 
signals about start-ups and receive them.
147
 On the one hand, reputable 
private VCs send positive signals about the start-ups they fund. These 
signals are sent to labor markets and later investors, including investment 
banks and public investors.
148
 Private VCs are able to send credible signals 
through their investment decisions because it is widely recognized that 
they have both the expertise and financial incentives to select and develop 
the most promising start-ups. In addition, as repeat players in the 
entrepreneurial finance market, private VCs serve as reputational 
intermediaries, meaning that if the signals they send are not credible, their 
reputations will suffer.
149
 Finally, venture capital investments are costly, 
 
 
 145. See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973); JUDITH 
DONATH, SIGNALS, TRUTH AND DESIGN (forthcoming). 
 146. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 645 (2002). 
 147. See Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, The Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 91, 94 (1998) (―The venture capital fund not only gathers information, it 
also provides it.‖). 
 148. Antonio Davila et al., Venture-Capital Financing and the Growth of Startup Firms 16 
(2002), http://news-info.wustl.edu/pdf/gupta_venture_capital.pdf (―The support of venture capital—
through the funding event—provides a relevant signal to separate startups with different quality.‖). 
 149. Black, supra note 147, at 94 (―In what is loosely called the ‗high-tech‘ area, where 
information asymmetry is especially severe because high-tech companies often have short histories 
and make highly specialized products, we have developed a correspondingly specialized intermediary, 
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and signaling theory is a better fit in situations where the signal is costly to 
send and cannot be easily mimicked.
150
 For all of these reasons, private 
VCs can and will send credible signals through their investment decisions.  
On the other hand, private VCs also receive signals from other groups 
when making their own investment decisions. Of course, private VCs will 
conduct their own, thorough due diligence review of potential investments. 
When conducting due diligence, ―the [VC] will typically consider 
numerous factors . . . [including] the entrepreneurial firm‘s technology, the 
managerial ability of the firm‘s founders, the dynamics of the market(s) in 
which the entrepreneurial firm hopes to compete, and the potential 
responsiveness of the financial markets to a public offering . . . .‖151 Even 
after due diligence, however, private VCs remain subject to information 
asymmetries with entrepreneurs because the start-up environment is rife 
with both operational and scientific uncertainties.
152
 As a result, private 
VCs will look to receive signals that will help them make investment 
decisions.  
Where do private VCs look for signals about start-ups? The existing 
literature suggests at least two places: the start-up‘s patents and the terms 
of the investment contract between the VC and entrepreneur. First, private 
VCs look to a start-up‘s patent portfolio as a proxy for its quality.153 In an 
interesting paper, Clarisa Long has set forth a signaling theory for 
patents.
154
 After questioning the conventional assumption that patents are 
simply an entrepreneurial trade-off between the loss of proprietary 
information in exchange for patent rents, Long argues that patents can 
function as signals sent by entrepreneurs to reduce information 
 
 
the venture capital fund, that functions partly as a reputational intermediary.‖); Bernard S. Black & 
Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 
47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998); Long, supra note 146, at 662 (―Signalers . . . must be in the market long 
enough that observers believe them to have the incentive to invest in credible signaling.‖). 
 150. See F.H. Buckley, When the Medium is the Message: Corporate Buybacks as Signals, 65 IND. 
L.J. 493, 531 (1990) (―[T]he cost of adopting the signalling strategy will deter low quality firms from 
emitting that signal.‖). 
 151. Joel M. Podolny, Networks as the Pipes and Prisms of the Market, 107 AM. J. SOC. 33, 46 
(2001).  
 152. Gilson, supra note 23, at 1077. 
 153. See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1505–06 (2001). 
 154. See generally Long, supra note 146. Trademarks have also been viewed as sending a signal 
to consumers. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on 
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004) (―Trademark law, in theory, fosters the flow of 
information in markets. By protecting against deceptive uses of trade symbols in commerce, the law 
enables sellers to create their own reliable shorthand to identify their goods and reduces search costs 
for consumers.‖). 
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asymmetries with potential investors.
155
 She argues patents can serve as 
credible signals for several reasons, including that they are costly to 
obtain, indicate the start-up‘s line of research, and lead to penalties if 
patentees make misstatements to the Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO).
156
 
On the other hand, Long concedes that there are problems with patents 
as signals. First, the quantity of patents a start-up owns does not provide 
much information (other than that the start-up is not sluggish),
157
 and for 
the VC to analyze the quality of patents requires verification from 
attorneys, consultants, or scientists.
158
 When investors must go behind a 
signal to determine its credibility, the signal begins to lose its value as 
such. Second, entrepreneurs can send a patent signal themselves by 
applying for and obtaining a patent from the PTO. Although the PTO is a 
theoretical gatekeeper for patent quality, an increasingly understaffed PTO 
with examiners subject to tight deadlines does not perform this function 
well.
159
 Finally, Ronald Mann notes that sometimes patent protection is 
not the sort of thing that investors care about because they might be more 
interested in first-mover advantages.
160
 Because the patent process 
distracts management from the start-up‘s business, some investors could 
actually view patents as a negative signal. 
The second place that private VCs look for signals about start-up 
quality is their investment contracts with entrepreneurs. Private VCs stage 
their investments in start-ups for several reasons, including the signaling 
effect of staged financing. When entrepreneurs agree to delay future 
funding until reaching certain benchmarks, it sends a signal that this is a 
high-quality entrepreneur who believes these benchmarks will be 
reached.
161
 The same idea applies to convertible preferred stock, the 
security of choice for private VCs. By selling preferred stock to private 
VCs while holding common stock themselves, entrepreneurs signal their 
 
 
 155. Long, supra note 146, at 627 (―Patents can serve as a means of reducing informational 
asymmetries between patentees and observers. The ability to convey information credibly to observers 
at low cost is a highly valuable function of patents . . . .‖).  
 156. Id. at 647–50. 
 157. Id. at 654 (―Nobody associates obtaining patents with sloth and shiftlessness.‖). 
 158. Id. at 666 (―Verifying anything beyond [patent] quantity presents higher costs. Observers 
may employ experts such as attorneys, consultants, or scientists to examine individual patents more 
closely.‖). 
 159. Id. at 668 (―Complaints about the PTO‘s ability to screen patent applications adequately have 
been increasing. Under tight budgets and notoriously tight time schedules, the PTO lets patents slip 
through that contain incredible information.‖) (citation omitted). 
 160. Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
961, 976–77 (2005).  
 161. See Gilson, supra note 23, at 1080. 
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belief that the value of the start-up will exceed the amount of the VC‘s 
preference.
162
 As Michael Klausner and Kate Litvak observe, however, 
this signal is only credible if the entrepreneur can accurately gauge the 
value of his business.
163
 (The same would be true of staged financing.) 
This signaling theory also assumes, probably unrealistically, that the 
entrepreneur would pass up the opportunity for venture capital if he could 
not back up his signals. It is not a stretch to say that, considering how 
difficult it is to obtain private venture capital, most entrepreneurs would 
probably take the financing and see where it led. Thus, the signals that 
entrepreneurs send through their investment contracts are of questionable 
credibility. 
With the understanding that private VCs not only send signals about 
start-up quality, but also receive them, it is now possible to turn to the role 
of angel groups in sending these signals. It is my argument that angel 
groups can provide a better signal about a start-up‘s quality than either 
patents or investment contracts. Angel groups send signals precisely the 
same way that private VCs do. First, as discussed earlier, angel groups 
have both the expertise and financial incentives necessary to select and 
develop the most promising start-ups, which lend confidence to their 
investment decisions. Also, like private VCs, angel groups are repeat 
players in entrepreneurial finance who will suffer reputational sanctions if 
they vouch for poor start-ups. Finally, angel group signals are likewise 
costly to send—they require a large investment on the part of the angel 
group. For these reasons, angel groups can credibly signal the quality of 
their portfolio companies. 
Further, angel groups can actually enhance the accuracy of otherwise-
flawed patent signals. If a patent was obtained pre-angel group investment, 
the angel group probably reviewed the patent and viewed it positively. 
Long recognizes the ability of informational intermediaries to pass on a 
patent‘s credibility,164 and in this setting angel groups would be excellent 
informational intermediaries for reasons given. On the other hand, if a 
patent was obtained post-angel group investment, VCs might reasonably 
view obtaining the patent as an angel-approved use of scarce resources. 
 
 
 162. See Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture 
Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP: LINKING GOVERNANCE 
WITH REGULATORY POLICY 54, 56 (Michael J. Whincop ed., 2001). Of course this signaling function 
is only one of the reasons that VCs choose convertible preferred stock as their security. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Long, supra note 146, at 670–71 (discussing the role of ―second tier informational 
intermediaries‖ like BountyQuest as potential verifiers of a patent‘s quality, but noting that such firms 
must acquire reputations before investors will rely on their judgments). 
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Therefore, whether the angel group investment comes pre- or post-
patenting, it can enhance the credibility of the patent signal. 
For the reasons above, angel group funding can provide a better signal 
to VCs than either patents alone or investment contracts. Of course, while 
signaling theory is an attractive fit for angel groups, it remains to be seen 
whether theory will translate into practice. However, there is some 
indication that angel groups are having success attracting private venture 
capital for their start-ups. The ACA reports that in 2007, two-thirds of 
angel groups attracted either co- or follow-on investments from private 
VCs. I have been unable to obtain further information on this statistic, 
such as how many of an angel group‘s start-ups received private venture 
capital or whether the start-up was asked to relocate to obtain the venture 
capital. 
Even if angel groups can signal quality start-ups in non-tech regions, 
two outcomes are possible from a regional economic development 
perspective. One possibility is that private VCs will expand their 
operations into non-tech regions. Geographic expansion of private venture 
capital could come in the form of branch offices, as early-stage venture 
capital firm Draper Fisher and Jurvetson has done. As Steve Jurvetson has 
written: ―At [DFJ], we find that there is a positive cycle of 
entrepreneurship that occurs locally. . . .We have opened affiliate VC 
offices in nine U.S. locations . . . .‖165 Or it could be that private VCs 
begin to use angel groups as their proxies, relying on angel groups from 
afar for routine monitoring of start-ups. The other possibility is that private 
VCs will not follow angel groups into non-tech regions, but instead cause 
better-funded and more mature start-ups (after angel group funding) to 
relocate to Silicon Valley. This may not be of great concern in at least 
some cases, as relocation delayed could mean relocation prevented. For 
example, moving a small entrepreneurial team with no facilities or 
operations is easy, but moving a large number of employees in a firm that 
has leased facilities and ongoing operations is more difficult. 
V. LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: DO THE SECURITIES LAWS IMPEDE 
ANGEL GROUP FINANCING? 
The entrepreneurial finance story to this point has been a non-legal one. 
But, as Gordon Smith and I have discussed in a recent essay, law can be an 
important determinant of entrepreneurial activity.
166
 In a telling example 
 
 
 165. Jurvetson, supra note 75, at 125. 
 166. See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections on the 
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of how legal infrastructure affects the supply of human capital, Ronald 
Gilson reveals that a quirk of California history makes non-compete 
agreements unenforceable in that state.
167
 Gilson argues that the legal 
prohibition on non-competes allows high-tech talent to move between 
California firms, which results in knowledge spillovers and repeated bursts 
of innovation. Conversely, he observes that Massachusetts‘s enforcement 
of non-competes prevents high-tech mobility and its attendant benefits. 
Thus, in comparing the regional advantage of Silicon Valley over Route 
128 in terms of human capital, Gilson layers a legal story on top of 
AnnaLee Saxenian‘s cultural story.168 
My Article, however, focuses on the supply of financial capital. Can 
Gilson‘s idea of law as a determinant of supply be extended to financial 
capital? Some conversations with angel group investors and one prominent 
attorney in this area suggest so. Those discussions revealed some cause for 
concern about the applicability of securities laws to angel group activities. 
Specifically, the laws mentioned were the ban on general solicitation in 
private placement transactions and broker-dealer laws.  
In light of these concerns, I will now analyze the applicability of each 
of these laws to typical angel group activities. It bears repeating from the 
Introduction that the securities laws are only one example of how legal 
infrastructure might impede the supply of entrepreneurial finance, and this 
Article eschews a discussion of how governments might affirmatively 
attempt to entice greater supply of entrepreneurial finance through tax 
credits and the like.
169
 In addition, it is unclear without further study to 
what extent uncertainty over application of the securities laws to angel 
group activities actually creates inefficiencies in the market for angel 
group financing. 
A. The Ban on General Solicitation 
The first securities law that may impede angel group financing is the 
ban on general solicitation in most private placement transactions. 
Whenever a start-up issues its own equity or debt in exchange for a cash 
contribution, the start-up must either register that offering with the SEC (a 
costly and time-consuming process), or find an exemption. For an 
 
 
Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71 (2008). 
 167. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial 
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999). 
 168. See also ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A 
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003) (expanding upon the work of Saxenian and Gilson). 
 169. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text. 
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exemption, the start-up may argue that the offering did not involve a 
―security,‖ involved an exempt security, or was an exempt transaction. 
The first avenue, no ―security,‖ will usually prove fruitless, as start-ups 
typically organize as corporations and thus issue stock,
170
 which is an 
enumerated security under the federal securities laws.
171
 The second 
avenue, an exempt security, implicates the intrastate offering exemption 
under section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act, which will be discussed in 
this Part.
172
 The third avenue, an exempt transaction, is perhaps most 
likely to be successful, as offerings to a small number of accredited and 
sophisticated investors—such as the investors found in angel groups—
often count as exempt transactions, or private placements.  
The difficulty under the exempt transaction route, however, lies in a 
much-criticized requirement for most private placements: that the issuer 
not engage in general solicitation or general advertising to find investors. 
The ban on general solicitation is explicit in Regulation D, the widely used 
safe harbor provisions for private placements.
173
 Regulation D contains 
three separate exemptions: Rules 504, 505, and 506. Rule 504 exempts 
offerings up to $1 million in any twelve-month period;
174
 Rule 505 ups 
that limit to $5 million;
175
 and Rule 506 allows for an unlimited dollar 
amount provided other conditions are met.
176
 Rules 505 and 506 explicitly 
ban general solicitations at the federal level; Rule 504 permits an 
exemption at the federal level even if there is a general solicitation—
however, the issuer must comply with applicable state laws under those 
 
 
 170. See generally Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
1737 (1994); Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 
TAX L. REV. 137 (2003). 
 171. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 688–
92 (1985) (―stock‖ possessing usual characteristics of stock is a ―security‖). Even if the start-up is an 
―uncorporation‖ (e.g., an LLC or partnership), the sale of its equity interests still probably qualifies as 
an investment contract under the Howey test because the investor‘s profits depend predominantly on 
the efforts of the entrepreneur. See, e.g., SEC v. Merchant Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
 172. See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 173. Rule 502(c) provides in part:  
Limitation on manner of offering. Except as provided in § 230.504(b)(1), neither the issuer 
nor any person acting on its behalf shall offer or sell the securities by any form of general 
solicitation or general advertising, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) Any 
advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, 
or similar media or broadcast over television or radio; and (2) Any seminar or meeting whose 
attendees have been invited by any general solicitation or general advertising . . . .  
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 174. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2009). 
 175. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2009). 
 176. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2009). 
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circumstances, which usually require registration of the offering at the 
state level.  
To avoid making a general solicitation, the issuer must have a 
preexisting, substantive relationship with the potential investor.
177
 A 
preexisting relationship is a relationship that predates the solicitation for 
the present investment; a substantive relationship means one that ―would 
enable the issuer (or a person acting on its behalf) to be aware of the 
financial circumstances or sophistication of the persons with whom the 
relationship exists or that otherwise are of some substance and 
duration.‖178 Therefore, if an entrepreneur simply learns about her local 
angel group and submits an unsolicited business plan, she may well have 
engaged in a general solicitation and therefore an unregistered public 
offering rather than a private placement.
179
 An important question is 
whether an entrepreneur‘s relationship with one member of the angel 
group would carry forward to the other group members, since at least 
some entrepreneurs are selected for consideration by the group based on a 
group member‘s prior relationship with the entrepreneur. I could find no 
federal law on point, but at least under California state blue sky law, the 
relationship with one group member is not imputed to the full group, 
meaning that not knowing other members of the group would still mean 
the contact is a general solicitation.
180
 
There are several factors that mitigate against angel groups concerning 
themselves too much over the general solicitation ban, however. First, the 
SEC has shown no inclination to challenge the same practice of submitting 
business plans to venture capital firms, which has been occurring for 
considerably longer than angel groups have been in existence. This is 
 
 
 177. See Sjostrom, supra note 110, at 13–14 (―[T]he SEC has failed to issue any no-action letter 
finding the absence of general solicitation in the absence of [a preexisting, substantive] relationship.‖). 
 178. Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
2811, at *2 (Dec. 4, 1985). 
 179. Implicit in this statement is that the entrepreneur made an ―offer‖ to the angel group by 
submitting the business plan. ―Offer‖ is construed broadly under the 1933 Securities Act to be any 
activity that ―conditions the market‖ by arousing interest in the issuer. In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & 
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5870, 38 S.E.C. 843, at *6 (1959).  
 180. See Willie R. Barnes, The California Corporate Securities Law: An Overview of the Private 
Placement Exemption and Other Select Exemptions From Qualification, 1538 PRACTICING L. INST. 
465, 503 (2006) (citing California Department of Corporations Release 5-C issued January 31, 1969): 
[W]here such a close relationship exists only with one or a few members of the investor 
group, the lack of a relationship to the other investors continues to be indicative of a public 
offering. In addition, the fact that the investors are relative strangers to the issuer suggests a 
public offering, even though they are recruited by persons having a close relationship with the 
issuer, and even though a relatively close relationship exists among all members of the 
offeree group. 
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probably because private VCs, as well as angel group investors, are 
accredited, sophisticated investors with an expertise in start-up investing 
who can ―fend for themselves‖—the central idea underlying the public 
offering/private placement distinction.
181
 Therefore, even if the submission 
constitutes a general solicitation under a Regulation D safe harbor, angel 
groups may still, under limited circumstances, meet the fundamental 
criteria for a private placement under section 4(2).
182
 However, at least one 
court has read a firm general solicitation ban into section 4(2), albeit with 
some criticism given that safe harbors are designed to be more restrictive 
than the general rule on which they are based.
183
 Yet, it is the case that 
general solicitations are inconsistent with the idea of a non-public offering. 
Second, Rule 504—which permits general solicitations in offerings up 
to $1 million if the issuer complies with applicable state law—may be an 
available exemption for angel group investments. The average angel group 
investment in 2007 was $265,926.
184
 Even when aggregating these 
amounts with friends and family investments (typically up to $100,000) 
that occur in the year preceding the angel group offering results in a total 
investment well short of $1 million. Of course, the average private venture 
capital investment is now around $5 million;
185
 therefore, if private VCs 
invest within the same year as angel groups, Rule 504 would not be 
available for any of the investments. Also, Rule 504‘s requirement that the 
offering comply with state law may simply push the action to the state 
level. 
Third, section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act includes within its 
exemptions offerings that occur solely in a single state where the issuer 
does business.
186
 As previously discussed, angel groups are regional in 
 
 
 181. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
 182. To determine whether an offering counts as private under section 4(2), the SEC looks at 
several factors, including: the relationship of the offerees to each other and the issuer, the number of 
offerees, the number of units sold, and the size and manner of the offering. The most important of 
these factors is the relationship between the issuer and the offeree, which helps determine whether the 
offeree has ―effective access‖ to the information about the issuer. ―Effective access‖ is established 
when the offeree both has access to information about the issuer and adequate sophistication to make 
effective use of it. The combination substitutes for the disclosure that issuers would others have to 
provide. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 183. In re Kenman Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 21,962, [Transfer Binder 1984–1985] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,767 (1985) (―The exemption from registration under Section 4(2) is not 
available to an issuer that is engaged in a general solicitation or general advertising.‖); STEPHEN J. 
CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS, TEACHER‘S MANUAL 814 
(2d ed. 2008) (suggesting that investors might be able to ―fend for themselves‖ under the foundational 
section 4(2) cases without having a preexisting relationship with an issuer). 
 184. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 186. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2006) (exemption for registration 
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nature, with each state boasting one or more groups. So long as the 
group‘s members are all drawn from within the single state, and the state 
is one where the start-up does business, the intrastate exemption should 
apply. Commentators have noted, however, the SEC‘s tendency to take a 
narrow view of the intrastate exemption under the safe harbor of Rule 
147.
187
 
Fourth, for issuers in California, another unique route to an exemption 
may be available. That is, California‘s state blue sky law actually permits 
general solicitation, and SEC‘s Regulation CE, a coordinated federal-state 
exemption, actually exempts the issuer from compliance at the federal 
level if state law is complied with.
188
 
Finally, even if the ban on general solicitation is violated by typical 
entrepreneurial fundraising practices, and the offering does not otherwise 
qualify as a private placement, angel groups would arguably be the 
beneficiaries of the violation rather than penalized for it. Investors who 
buy in a public offering that violates section 5 of the Securities Act of 
1933 are entitled to rescission under the Act‘s section 12(a)(1). Therefore, 
if the angels‘ investment turns out to be a bad one, they could use the fact 
that a general solicitation took place to argue for recoupment of their 
investment. On the other hand, there may be reputational reasons not to do 
this, and the start-up will likely have already spent the funds, making them 
judgment-proof. A further downside is that other disgruntled investors in 
an aggregated offering may seek rescission (that would likely come from 
any remaining angel-invested funds). In addition, a prior general 
solicitation may complicate efforts to raise future funds from VCs, should 
they uncover the violation during due diligence, and for start-ups that seek 
an exit through IPO, the SEC may delay an IPO where general solicitation 
has occurred.  
 
 
for ―[a]ny security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single 
State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing business within . . . 
such State or Territory‖). 
 187. See Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1961 SEC LEXIS 90, at *12 (Dec. 6, 1961) (―[T]he 
provisions of [Section 3(a)(11)] can exempt only issues which in reality represent local financing by 
local industries, carried out through local investment. Any distribution not of this type raises a serious 
question as to the availability of Section 3(a)(11).‖). For example, an offer (as opposed to a sale) to a 
single non-resident could nullify the exemption. 
 188. See Sjostrom, supra note 110, at 27–29. 
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B. Possible Broker-Dealer Issues 
The second securities law that may impede angel group financing is the 
registration requirement for ―broker-dealers.‖ A broker is ―any person 
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the 
account of others,‖189 while a dealer is ―any person engaged in the 
business of buying and selling securities for [his] own account . . . but not 
as part of a regular business.‖190 The terms, though distinct, are often 
conflated and a person is analyzed not as a potential broker or dealer, but a 
potential broker-dealer.
191
 Through no-action letters, the SEC has provided 
guidance on who it will view as a broker-dealer or an exempt finder. 
Whether a person is ―engaged in the business‖ and ―effecting transactions 
in securities‖ are the key inquiries.192 One is ―engaged in the business‖ if 
she participates in the securities business with some regularity, receives 
transaction-based compensation, and holds herself out as a broker. One is 
―effecting transactions in securities‖ if she solicits investments, conducts 
due diligence, provides advice on the merits of the investment, and helps 
structure and negotiate the transaction. Broker-dealer issues arise not only 
at the federal level, but the state level as well.
193
 
It may seem odd to think these definitions cause concern for angel 
group investors, as they are not who we commonly think of as broker-
dealers. Yet a particular angel group practice may prove problematic under 
broker-dealer law. That is, once an entrepreneur has passed an initial 
screening in front of the full angel group, the members of the group 
interested in investing will perform further diligence on the start-up. One 
angel investor will typically take the lead and, should the angels ultimately 
invest in the start-up, the angel leading the due diligence will receive extra 
stock in the start-up as compensation for her efforts. The concern with this 
practice is that because one angel leads the due diligence, recommends the 
merits of the transaction to the other angels, and receives transaction-based 
 
 
 189. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2006). 
 190. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(5) (2006). 
 191. See David A. Lipton, A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 899, 909 
(1987) (―Frequently, in judicial or administrative analysis, both definitions are discussed, and the 
person in question is characterized as being a ‗broker and a dealer‘ or a ‗broker-dealer‘ without further 
clarification as to which definition has been satisfied by the person‘s activities.‖) (citation omitted). 
 192. See Orcutt, supra note 69, at 904–15 for a discussion of these issues with cites to SEC No-
Action letters. 
 193. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public Through an Internet Direct Public Offering: A 
Sensible Alternative for Small Companies?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 529, 565 (2001) (discussing state broker-
dealer laws). 
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compensation for her efforts, the SEC could view her as a broker-dealer.
194
 
It is possible that this would entitle other investors in aggregated 
transactions to rescission that would come from angel funds.
195
 This cloud 
of uncertainty over broker-dealer laws could mean that no angel is willing 
to take the lead on due diligence, which would impede optimal levels of 
angel group funding. 
The broker-dealer laws appear more of a cause for concern to angel 
groups than does the general solicitation ban. As with the general 
solicitation ban, however, there are mitigating factors that argue against 
the classification angel group investors who lead due diligence efforts and 
receive transaction-based compensation as broker-dealers. First, although 
these angels bear some hallmarks of broker-dealers, they lack others. For 
example, these angels appear to be ―engaged in the business‖ because they 
receive transaction-based compensation, yet because the angels take turns 
leading diligence, no individual angel is involved in this practice with 
―some regularity.‖196 In addition, no angel group investor holds herself out 
as a broker-dealer, which is another factor the SEC considers.
197
 Both of 
these factors cut against the view that angel group investors who lead due 
diligence efforts are ―engaged in the business.‖ ―Effecting transactions in 
securities,‖ on the other hand, appears to be more problematic for these 
angels, as they do have a heavy hand in start-up investments on behalf of 
themselves and their fellow angels.
198
 
Second, even if angel group investors who lead due diligence and 
receive transaction-based compensation are classified as broker-dealers, 
the 1934 Act provides an exemption from registration for broker-dealers 
involved in transactions that are ―exclusively intrastate‖ and do not ―make 
 
 
 194. See, e.g., Birchtree Fin. Serv., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 652137, at *1 (Sept. 22, 
1998) (―The Division has taken the position that the receipt of securities commissions or other 
transaction-related compensation is a key factor in determining whether a person or an entity is acting 
as a broker-dealer.‖); Mr. John R. Wirthlin, SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 34898, at *1 (Jan. 19, 
1999) (―You would also receive transaction-based compensation, one of the hallmarks of being a 
broker-dealer.‖). 
 195. See generally Samuel H. Gruenbaum & Marc I. Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
 196. See Lipton, supra note 191, at 910–11 (discussing regularity). 
 197. See Orcutt, supra note 69, at 915 (discussing holding oneself out as a broker-dealer). 
 198. If an angel other than the one who brought the start-up before the full group leads due 
diligence efforts, then there would be no ―solicitation.‖ However, as I understand the typical practice, 
the angel who recommends the start-up to the full group may also be the one who leads due diligence 
on a potential investment.  
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use of any facility of a national securities exchange.‖199 Angel group 
investments are designed as private placements, as discussed, and 
therefore do not make use of a national securities exchange. Angel groups 
are also regional, as discussed, and draw their members from the state in 
which they are located. Therefore, if there is no syndication of investments 
with angel groups or VCs in other states, angel group investments should 
fall within the intrastate exemption from broker-dealer registration. 
However, this does not completely solve the problem because angels 
would still be considered broker-dealers, albeit ones who are not required 
to register. Other rules applicable to even unregistered broker-dealers, 
such as net capital requirements, would still apply.
200
  
In sum, there are reasons that angel investors who lead due diligence 
efforts for their groups and receive transaction-based compensation might 
look like broker-dealers, but there are also reasons to think that the SEC 
may not challenge this practice. The ban on general solicitation in private 
placements, the broker-dealer registration requirements, and perhaps other 
securities laws are valid concerns for angel group investors,
201
 but my 
analysis also found mitigating factors that argue against their application 
in this context. Should these laws be found to create inefficiencies in the 
market for angel group financing through the reality or even perception 
that they will apply and be enforced, the SEC should consider narrowly 
tailored exemptions for angel group activities.
202
  
 
 
 199. Section 15(a)(1) states that:  
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer . . . (other than such a broker or dealer whose 
business is exclusively intrastate and who does not make use of any facility of a national 
securities exchange) to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce to effect any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale 
of, any security . . . unless such broker or dealer is registered [with the SEC].  
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 200. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2009) (detailing net capital requirements for brokers and 
dealers); Steven L. Molinari & Nelson S. Kibler, Broker-Dealers’ Financial Responsibility under the 
Uniform Net Capital Rule—A Case for Liquidity, 72 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 n.38 (1983) (observing that the net 
capital rules apply to all broker-dealers, not just registered broker-dealers). 
 201. For example, the Investment Company Act of 1940 could apply to angel groups with over 
100 members who invest as a group or to angel groups who use ―sidecar‖ funds (made up of angels 
and their friends/family) with over 100 members. See Duke K. Bristow et al., Venture Capital 
Formation and Access: Lingering Impediments of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 2004 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 77 (2004) (analyzing possible Investment Company Act application to venture capital 
practice). This is not to mention more obvious securities laws that could affect entrepreneurial finance 
more broadly, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which raises the cost of exiting start-up 
investments through an initial public offering. See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost of IPOs 
Depresses Venture Capital in the United States, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 369 (2006). 
 202. A possible model the SEC could look to is the broker-dealer exemption for companies and 
agents created by the Uniform Securities Act. See Sjostrom, supra note 193, at 565. 
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CONCLUSION 
Silicon Valley‘s unique history and its current status as a highly 
evolved entrepreneurial ecosystem inevitably lead to a healthy dose of 
skepticism about the prospects of cloning it elsewhere. This skepticism is 
well justified, as most cloning efforts have failed. To the disappointment 
of economic developers, there has been no recipe or blueprint to follow to 
achieve analogous results.  
Do these failures lead to the inevitable conclusion that Silicon Valley 
cannot be replicated? Perhaps, but it may be the case that Silicon Valley 
―lites‖ could be created if human capital and financial capital are both 
present. Whether human capital or financial capital is the larger 
impediment to local innovation is a region-specific, empirical question. 
However, this Article has argued that while innovation funding appears 
problematic for non-tech regions, the rise of angel investment groups 
presents an attractive solution for the future. In short, angel groups 
combine the best features of private venture capital and state-sponsored 
alternatives—the private VC‘s expertise and market incentives, the state 
VC‘s supply of risk capital and geographic distribution. This 
entrepreneurial finance story was supplemented by a ―law and 
entrepreneurship‖ story, specifically how application of the securities laws 
to angel group financings might impede their activities. 
This Article is a first step in building a theory of comparative 
advantage in entrepreneurial finance. Angel groups are still quite young, 
and therefore it is too soon to tell whether their theoretical advantages will 
translate to broader distribution of innovative activity in practice. Once 
angel groups move past their infancy, empirical studies can be undertaken 
to test the arguments advanced in this Article. 
 
